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VOLUME 60 FALL 1995 NUMBER 4
The Duty of Mental Health Care Providers
to Restrain Their Patients Or Warn Third
Parties
Timothy E. Gammon* and John K Hulston'*
I. INTRODUCTION
When should liability be imposed upon those who fail to prevent injury
or ring the alarm bell? This article addresses two well worn and hotly debated
issues from a Missouri perspective. First, should physicians, other mental
health care providers, mental health care hospitals, and other facilities be liable
for either: (1) the failure to restrain a patient, or (2) the release of a patient
who subsequently injures an individual member of the general public?
Second, should there be liability for failure to warn specific third persons,
members of law enforcement, other officials, or the public generally in such
situations?
Initially, a landmark California case thrust those issues into the national
legal spotlight, and a national debate ensued.' Although the common law and
philosophical foundation for imposing liability in such situations was neither
new, nor presented for the first time in Tarasoff,2 that decision triggered
national debate and engendered what has been generally recognized as a
virtual cottage industry of analysis.
Subsequently, almost every state has considered the issue and discussed
Tarasoff. Many jurisdictions either have followed, or have indicated they
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1968, J.D., St. Louis University 1974, LL.M., Harvard University 1976.
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1. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en
banc).
2. See Jarrett v. Wills, 383 P.2d 995 (Or. 1963); Fowler V. Harper & Porey M.
Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
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would follow the lead of Tarasoff and impose liability for either failure to
warn, failure to restrain, or both
Among those states that have embraced Tarasoff, Michigan, New Jersey,
and Vermont have followed Tarasoff, and have established a common law
duty of a psychotherapist to warn readily identifiable victims of their patients'
violent intentions Connecticut and Delaware have expanded the duty to warn
particular individuals to include identifiable classes of potential victims.'
Arizona, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wisconsin have extended the
Tarasoff duty to any foreseeable victim, even if there has been no specific
threat to that victim.' Ohio and Georgia not only have recognized the duty to
warn set out in Tarasoff, but also have extended it to include a duty to take
reasonable measures to protect or control the patient.' And some courts which
have failed to impose a duty based on the facts of individual cases, such as the
3. See, e.g., Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976); Bradley
Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982); Estate of Mathes v. Ireland, 419
N.E.2d 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 86 (Kan. 1983);
Pangbum v. Saad, 326 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Leverett v. State, 399 N.E.2d
106 (Oh. Ct. App. 1978); Peterson v. State, 671 P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983).
4. See Bardoni v. Kim, 390 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (finding duty to
warn identifiable victim); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1979) (codified at
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West Supp. 1995)); Peck v. Counseling Serv., 499
A.2d 422, 426 (Vt. 1985).
5. See Almonte v. New York Medical College, 851 F. Supp. 34, 41 (D. Conn.
1994); Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1073 (Del. 1988) (duty to warn the general
public, which could have been injured as a result of an automobile accident with the
psychotic patient) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5402 (Supp. 1994))
(providing that a duty exists when the "patient has communicated.., an explicit and
imminent threat to kill or seriously injure a clearly identified victim or victims, or to
commit a specific violent act or to destroy property under circumstances which could
easily lead to serious personal injury or death, and the patient has an apparent intent
and ability to carry out the threat .... ).
6. See Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 836
F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987); Lopper v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb.
1980) (imposing dutyto control anyone foreseeably endangered by a patient); Hamman
v. County of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Ariz. 1989) (foreseeable victim is
anyone "within the zone of danger, that is, subject to probable risk of the patient's
violent conduct"); Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1988).
The duty in Nebraska was subsequently limited by the Nebraska legislature to any
"reasonably identifiable victim or victims." SeeNEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-1, 206.30, 71-
1, 336 (Supp. 1994).
7. See, e.g., Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d 449
(Ohio 1988) (court found a duty to control in-patients but declined to decide if it
extended to out-patients); Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982)
(duty on mental hospital to control patient in hospital's control).
[Vol. 60
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DUTY TO RESTRAIN OR WARA
lack of a specific threat, have indicated that they would impose a duty to warn
an identified potential victim.'
Other jurisdictions have rejected Tarasoff, in whole or part. One court
expressly rejected the holding of Tarasoff, reasoning that the nature of the
relationship between the patient and the psychotherapist was insufficient to
impose a duty to warn on the psychotherapist.' Subsequently, Florida passed
legislation which allows a psychiatrist to disclose patient communications to
the extent necessary to warn potential victims or law enforcement
authorities."0
II. CASES ADDRESSING MENTAL HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS'
DUTY TO RESTRAIN AND WARN.
A. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California
When analyzing a psychiatrist's duty to warn, most commentators and
judges include Tarasoff in their analysis. Tarasoff has been well reported in
both legal and mental health care journals." Missouri courts have relied on
8. See Morton v. Prescott, 564 So. 2d 913, 916 (Ala. 1990) ("Once these specific
threats are verbalized, then the possibility of harm to third persons becomes foreseeable
and the psychiatrist's duty arises."); Eckhardt v. Kirts, 534 N.E.2d 1339, 1344 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989), cert. denied, 541 N.E.2d 1105 (1989); Leonard v. Latrobe Area Hosp.,
625 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (construing Tarasoffto apply to a specific threat,
lacking in this case, to a specific person).
9. Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 448-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). For
other jurisdictions declining to impose liability on the basis of Tarasoff, see Brady v.
Hopper, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984); Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999
(D. Md. 1982); Soutear v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Leedy
v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981); Thompson v. County of Alameda,
614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980) (en banc); Leonard v. State, 491 N.W.2d 508 (Iowa 1992);
Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982).
10. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.2415 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995).
11. Among the legal journals in which Tarasoffhas been reported, see, e.g., James
C. Beck, Violent Patients and the Tarasoff Duty in Private Psychiatric Practice, 13 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 361 (1985); Richard J. Hulteng, The Duty to Warn or Hospitalize:
The New Scope of TarasoffLiability in Michigan, 67 U. DET. L. REv. 1 (1989); Peter
F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REv. 97, 98 (1994); Michael L. Perlin,
Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New Directions for the 1990's,
16 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 29 (1992); D.L. Rosenhan, et al., Warning Third
Parties: The Ripple Effect of Tarasoff, 24 PAC. L.J. 1165 (1993); Robert F. Schopp
& Michael R. Quattrocchi, Tarasoff, The Doctrine of Special Relationships and the
Psychotherapists Duty to Warn, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 13 (1984); Alan A. Stone,
The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L.
1995]
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REV. 358 (1976); John V. Lee, Comment, Psychiatry-Torts-A Psychotherapist Who
Knows or Should Know His Patient Intends Violence to Another Incurs a Duty to
Warn, 7 CJlMB. L. REV. 551 (1977); Comment, Torts Psychiatry and the Law-Duty
to Warn Potential Victim of a Homicidal Patient, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University
of California, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1011 (1977); Steven J. Bednar, Note, The
Psychotherapists's Calamity, Emerging Trends in the Tarasoff Doctrine, 1989 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 261; Russell S. Newman, Note, The TarasoffProgeny: Creating a Weaponless
Policeman with a "Deep Pocket", 15 CAP. U. L. REv. 699 (1986); Note, Tarasoffv.
Regents of the University of California, 65 CAL. L. REV. 517 (1977); Robert N. Cohen,
Note, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California: The Duty to Warn:
Common Law and Statutory Problems for California Psychotherapists, 14 CAL. W. L.
REV. 153 (1978); Brad S. Seligman, Note, Untangling Tarasoff, Tarasoff v. Regents
of the University of California, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 179 (1977); Michael R. Geske, Note,
Statutes Limiting Mental Health Professionals' Liability for the Violent Acts of Their
Patients, 64 IND. L.J. 391 (1989); Maryellen Kelleher, Note, Psychotherapists and the
duty to Warn: An Attempt at Clarification, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 597 (1983); Kent
M. Morrow, Note, Physicians & Surgeons Negligence-Psychotherapist Has a Duty
to Warn an Endangered Victim Whose Peril Was Disclosed by Psychotherapist by
Patient, 53 N.D. L. REV. 279 (1976); Diane S. Salter, Note, The Duty to Warn Third
Parties: A Retrospective on Tarasoff, 18 RUTGERs L.J. 145 (1986); Thomas J.
Murphy, Note, Affirmative Duties in Tort Following Tarasoff, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
492 (1984); Alexander J. Olander, Note, Discovery of Psychotherapist-Patient
Communications after Tarasoff, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 265 (1978); Toni P. Wise,
Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the
Effect of Tarasoff 31 STAN. L. REV. 165 (1978); Andrew C. Greenburg, Note, Florida
Rejects a Tarasoff Duty to Protect, 22 STETSON L. REv. 239 (1992); Marjorie B.
Lewis, Note, Duty to Warn Versus Duty to Maintain Confidentiality: Conflicting
Demands on Mental Health Professionals, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 579 (1986); Nancy
A. Nesbitt, Note, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California:
Psychotherapist's Obligation of Confidentiality Versus the Duty to Warn, 12 TULSA
L.J. 747 (1977); Ginger M. McClarren, Note, The Psychiatric Duty to Warn: Walking
a Tightrope of Uncertainty, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 269 (1987); Theodore A. Olsen, Note,
The Duty to Warn: Imposing a Duty to Warn on Psychiatrists-Judicial Threat to the
Psychiatric Profession, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 286 (1977).
Among medical journals in which Tarasoff has been reported, see Paul S.
Appelbaum, M.D., Tarasoff. An Update on the Duty to Warn, 32 HosP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 14 (1981); James C. Beck, Violent Patients and the Tarasoff
Duty in Private Psychiatric Practice, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 361 (1985); Alexander
D. Brooks, Mental Health Law-The Duty of Psychotherapists and Administrators to
Protect Third Persons from the Potential Violence of a Patient, 17 ADMINISTRATION
AND POLICY IN MENTAL HEALTH 185 (1990); Elizabeth M. Crocker, Judicial
Expansion of the Tarasoff Doctrine: Doctors' Dilemma, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 83
(1985); Everstine, Privacy and Confidentiality in Psychotherapy, 35 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 828 (1980); Linn Turner Greenberg, M.D., The Evolution of Tarasoff:
Recent Developments in the Psychiatrist's Duties to Warn Potential Victims, Protect
[Vol. 60
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DUTY TO RESTRAIN OR WARN
the reasoning and conclusions in Tarasoffto formulate Missouri law governing
the duty a psychiatrist has to warn potential victims.
First, the Tarasoff court concluded that foreseeability was the most
important consideration in establishing a duty.'2 Generally recognizing that
there is no duty to control the conduct of another, the court noted an
exception, found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Prosser on the Law
of Torts. The Restatement recognizes a duty to control when one .stands in a
special relationship to either: (1) the person who needs to be controlled (i.e.
a mental patient) or, (2) the foreseeable victim of a patient's conduct. 3
Concluding that such a special relationship arises between a patient and
his physician, the court held that relationship supports affirmative duties to
third persons. 4
The attendant liability of the hospital was added by a footnote:
When a hospital has notice or knowledge of facts from which it might
reasonably be concluded that a patient would be likely to harm himself or
others unless preclusive measures were taken, then the hospital must use
reasonable care in the circumstances to prevent such harm. 5
The court explained that the hospital's liability was supported by several
decisions holding a mental hospital liable if it negligently permits the escape
or release of a dangerous patient. 6 Without any analysis, the court assumed
the Public, and Predict Dangerousness, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 315 (1984); Howard
Gurevitz, M.D., Tarasoff. Protective Privilege Versus Public Peril, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 289 (1977); Oldham, Liability of Therapists to Non-Patients, J. CLINICAL
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 187 (Fall 1987); Loren H. Roth & Alan Meisel, Dangerousness,
Confidentiality, and the Duty to Warn, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 508 (1977); Lawson
R. Wulsin, Bursztajn & Gutheil, Unexpected Clinical Features of the Tarasoff
Decision: The Therapeutic Alliance and the "Duty to Warn," 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
601 (1983).
12. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342.
13. Id. at 343 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c and
PROSSER ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 56, at 341 (4th ed. 1971)).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 344 n.7 (citing Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 432 P.2d 193, 196 (Cal.
1967) (en banc)).
16. Id. (citing Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C., 44 U.S.L.W.
2439 (4th Cir. 1976); Underwood v. United States 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966); Fair
v. United States 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Greenberg v. Barbour 322 F. Supp. 745
(E.D.Pa. 1971) (upholding a cause of action against a hospital staff physician whose
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that the physician has control in such situations. The court quoted a law
review article which concluded that:
[There now seems to be sufficient authority to support the conclusion that
by entering into a doctor-patient relationship the therapist becomes
sufficiently involved to assume some responsibility for the safety, not only
of the patient himself, but also of any third person whom the doctor knows
to be threatened by the patient.' 7
The article explained that authority was consistent with "contemporary
ground rules on the duty relationship."' 8 The court side-stepped the American
Psychiatric Association's argument that therapists cannot predict their patients'
violent acts, and that psychiatric predictions are more often wrong than right. 9
The court dismissed these arguments by concluding that there was no question
about predictability because the therapists had accurately predicted the
patient's violence. The issue in Tarasoff was whether a therapist has a duty
to act upon the accurate prediction that the patient would harm a specific
individual."
Acknowledging that imposing liability would inhibit free and open
communication or violate California law governing the release of confidential
information, the court said that unnecessary warnings were a reasonable price
to pay.2' The court next found the therapist was not exempt from liability for
failure to warn based on statutory governmental immunity, primarily because
of the lack of specific statutory language indicating immunity in the context
of a therapist. The court also declined to extend immunity based on public
policy.'
17. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 344 (quoting John G. Fleming & Bruce Maximov, The
Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1025, 1030
(1974)).
18. See, e.g., Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d 449
(Ohio 1988) (court found a duty to control in-patients but declined to decide if it
extended to out-patients); Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982)
(duty on mental hospital to control patient in hospital's control).
19. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 344 (citing People v. Bumick, 535 P.2d 352 (Cal.
1975)); John Monahan, The Prevention of Violence, in COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Monahan ed. 1975); Bernard L. Diamond, The
Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1975); Bruce J.
Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974).
20. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345.
21. Id. at 346-48.
22. Id. at 349-50.
[Vol. 60
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The court conceded, however, that specific language under the
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, provided immunity against a claim for failing
to restrain or confine a patient.24 The court noted that:
Section 856 affords public entities and their employees absolute protection
from liability for 'any injury resulting from determining in accordance with
any applicable enactment . . . whether to confine a person for mental
illness. .. .'
The language and legislative history of section 856, however, suggest
a far broader immunity. . . . The Legislature . . . broadly extended
immunity to all employees who acted in accord with "any applicable
enactment," thus granting immunity not only to persons who are empowered
to confine, but also to those authorized to request or recommend
confinement.
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act... eliminated any specific statutory
reference to petitions by treating physicians, but it did not limit the
authority of a therapist in government employ to request, recommend or
initiate actions which may lead to commitment of his patient .... [T]he
language of section 856... protects the therapist who must undertake this
delicate and difficult task. Thus the scope of the immunity extends not
only to the final determination to confine.., the person for mental illness,
but to all determinations involved in the process of commitment.25
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act offered no protection for the therapist in
Tarasoff, however, because confinement was not the issue.26 The court
answered the issue of duty to warn in the affirmative and imposed liability on
the therapist. The court did find immunity under the Act, however, for the
police officers who released the patient after briefly confining him.'
B. Sherrill v. Wilson
In Sherrill v. Wilson, plaintiff sued the state of Missouri and various
hospital officials and physicians because a mental patient killed plaintiffs
relative.28 A mental patient named Corley had been committed to a state
hospital by court order. After being released on a two-day pass, Corley killed
23. CAL. GovT. CODE § 856 (1995).
24. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 351.
25. Id. at 351-52 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 353.
27. Id.
28. Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
1995]
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plaintiff's relative.29 The plaintiff alleged gross negligence for two reasons:
(1) releasing Corley on a pass when the hospital knew of his severe mental
illness and dangerous proclivities, and (2) failing to recapture Corley after he
overstayed his pass.3" The trial court held that the petition did not state a
claim for relief and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.3 The court noted
that several Missouri statutes in Chapter 632 were on point, but did not take
effect until after the death occurred.32 Thus, the court explained, it did not
have "to interpret or to apply the new statutes."3 Instead, the court reasoned
that the case had to be "decided on ordinary negligence principles. 3 4
Although the fatal attack in Sherrill did not occur until several weeks
after Corley was due to return from his pass, the court assumed "that the
issuance of the pass was an event in the direct chain of causation."35 The
court identified the issue as whether the treating physicians owed "such a duty
to the general public in deciding which involuntary patients should be released
on pass... as to give rise to a civil action by a member of the general public
for negligent exercise of judgment. '36 The court held that physicians owed
no such duty to the general public.37 The court reasoned:
Corley was an involuntary patient, but he was not a convict. The law
provides for involuntary confinement of persons in mental hospitals if it can
be judicially established that they are dangerous to themselves or to the
public, but the authority for confinement is hedged about by severe
restrictions. The patients are required to be held in the least restrictive
environment compatible with their safety and that of the public, and are
entitled to treatment. The treating physicians, in their evaluation of the
case, well might believe that Corley could be allowed to leave the
institution for a prescribed period and that his release on pass might
contribute to his treatment and recovery. We do not believe that they
should have to function under the threat of civil liability to members of the
general public when making decisions about passes and releases. The
plaintiff could undoubtedly find qualified psychiatrists who would testify
that the treating physicians exercised negligent judgment, especially when
they are fortified by hindsight. The effect would be fairly predictable. The
29. Id at 662.
30. Id
31. Id. at 662, 669.
32. Id. at 664; see Mo. RnV. STAT. § 632 (1994) (effective January 2, 1979).
33. Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 664. The court did, however, observe that the statutes
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treating physicians would indulge every presumption in favor of further
restraint, out of fear of being sued. Such a climate is not in the public
interest.38
The court distinguished Tarasoff from the Sherrill case as involving a
danger "to a particular individual, and the claimed breach of duty was the
failure to warn that individual.
3 9
The court found the petition in Sherrill contained no allegation that the
defendant physicians knew that Corley posed a particular danger to the
plaintiff's decedent. The court instead found the California case of Thompson
v. County of Alameda4° to be on, point. In Thompson, the California Supreme
Court distinguished between a mental patient known to pose a threat to "a
foreseeable or readily identifiable target" and one alleged to be a danger to the
general public." The court in Thompson also expressly distinguished Tarasoff
as involving threats to a specific individual.42
The court focused on the fact that the patient in Sherrill was involuntarily
committed and, therefore, declined to follow Mathes v. Ireland and Semler v.
Psychiatric Institute, and section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,43
which deals with the assumption of care and control of dangerous mental
patients.44
The court explained that even if it assumed Corley was a severely
mentally ill person, and danger to the public could be reasonably anticipated,
that:
[t]he defendant physicians should not be held liable for even foreseeable
civil damages simply because they might be found to have exercised
negligent professional judgment in permitting him to leave the premises.
The decision to hold a person against his will is a very serious one,
especially when the detainee has not been convicted of a crime. We believe
38. Id. (footnotes omitted).
39. Id. at 666 (citing Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966);
Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956)).
40. 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980).
41. Id. at 734.
42. Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 666.
43. See, e.g., Mathes v. Ireland, 419 N.E.2d 782, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)
(allowing a cause of action to be stated against physiatric clinic); Semler v. Psychiatric
Institute, 538 F.2d 121, 123 (4th Cir. 1976) (upholding ajudgment against psychiatrists
for negligence in care of a mental health patient which resulted in the death of
plaintiff's daughter); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 319 (1965).
44. Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 666.
1995]
9
Gammon and Hulston: Gammon: Duty of Mental Health Care Providers
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
that 'an actual holding of liability would have worse consequences than the
possibility of actual mistake.'
4
The court then emphasized:
the persons responsible for Corley's custody and treatment do not owe a
civil duty to the general public, with regard to securing his return. The
recognition of a duty of this kind could place a severe burden on the public
service. It would probably not be difficult in many cases to make a case
for the jury as to the foreseeability of injury, but this is not sufficient to
establish a duty to the public at large. 6
The court also dealt with plaintiff's argument based on Missouri Revised
Statute section 202.430 (1969), now repealed, which authorized state hospital
authorities to call upon the local sheriff to assist in apprehending escaped or
strayed inmates.47
Plaintiff argued there was an affirmative duty to notify the sheriff in such
situations. The court was reluctant to find an implied civil action from
statutes that do not refer to civil liability in express terms.48 The court held
that, at a minimum, a plaintiff must be a member of a class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted.49
The Sherrill court concluded that public interest and policy required
denying a cause of action against public employees who fail to return to
custody public mental hospital patients who were on temporary leave when
said patients injure a member of the general public.5" The treating
45. Id. at 667 (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 29.10).
46. Id at 668.
47. Id at 668.
48. Id. at 669 (citing Shqeir v. Equifax, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc).
49. Id. at 669 (citing 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes, §§ 432-33). The court explained:
The statute here cited was not passed for the benefit of a discrete class. Its
primary purpose is to authorize one governmental agency to call on another
for help. There is no indication of any special duty in the language of the
statute. The statute does not clearly require the hospital authorities to notify
the sheriff. A statute of this kind will not be read as conferring a civil
action by implication. Nor may the plaintiff base a civil action on the duty
of the hospital authorities to keep the committed person in custody as
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psychiatrists owe no duty to the public generally to impose tort liability for
negligence.5
C. Matt v. Burrell
In 1995, the Missouri Supreme Court reaffirmed its stance articulated in
Sherrill, by declining to change the lower court's holding that mental health
care givers and facilities would not be liable for failure to restrain a patient
who injures a previously unidentified member of the general public.52
Matt v. Burrell, Inc. was an action for the wrongful death of Mary Lynn
Matt, who died as a result of a vehicular collision. Count I of the petition,
seeking recovery against a mental hospital, two hospital employees and a
doctor was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
Plaintiffs argued that a claim was stated for the following reasons: (1)
a special relationship of patient/mental health care providers existed between
defendants and their patient LeAnn Olshavsky, which imposed a duty upon
defendants to use reasonable care to control her conduct toward third persons,
such as Mary Lynn Matt, and (2) defendants had "taken charge" of Olshavsky,
whom they knew or should have known to be likely to cause bodily harm to
others if not controlled, and thus, they had a duty to exercise reasonable care
to control her to prevent such harm.53
The Petition enumerated several allegations, which can be summarized
as follows:
1. December 19, 1990, decedent died as a direct result of a collision
when defendant Olshavsky drove her vehicle into decedent's lane, and
into decedent.
2. Burrell is a community psychiatric rehabilitation center.
Olshavsky was and had been a patient of Burrell.
! 3. Olshavsky had fifteen (15) prior hospitalizations for mental
illness, and had made repeated attempts at suicide. Defendants knew of
this history.
4. Olshavsky "presented herself' to Burrell at its facility and was
seen there by Goodwin and Clement. Olshavsky was mentally ill,
depressed and suicidal. Her condition was reported to McAfee.
5. Olshavsky stated that she was going to leave the Burrell facility
and kill herself by wrecking her car. The four defendants knew her
intent and knew she was a danger to herself and others if she were
permitted to leave. Defendants failed to stop her departure.
51. Id
52. Matt v. Burrell, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
53. Id. at 797.
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6. Burrell had taken charge of and treated Olshavsky since May 30,
1989, and participated in Olshavsky's involuntary detention in August
and early December 1990.
7. Burrell developed on an ongoing basis a "Critical Intervention
Plan" which included an involuntary 96-hour hold of Olshavsky should
the need arise. Burrell and its employees had a duty to restrain
Olshavsky on December 19, 1990.
8. Defendant negligently failed to: (a) prevent Olshavsky from
leaving the facility, (b) to diagnose and treat Olshavsky's mental illness,
(c) "timely call the police or other authority to restrain Olshavsky."
Decedent's death was the direct and proximate result of defendants'
negligence.54
The court in Matt found there was no breach of duty to restrain the
patient or warn others.5 The court recognized the duty regarding the acts of
a voluntary outpatient is less than that owed regarding a voluntary inpatient,
and the highest duty is imposed concerning a person who has been
involuntarily committed by court order." The court found that Olshavsky
was a voluntary patient, and thus, a lower duty was imposed on the
defendant.57
The court expanded the Matt plaintiffs' narrow interpretation of Sherrill
by holding that non-liability was not based on governmental immunity. 8
Specifically, the court explained:
Although Sherrill held that the state was protected from liability by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, that immunity was not available to some
of the individual defendants, nevertheless they owed no duty to the general
public. In the absence of a duty, there could be no breach, and thus no
liability for the death of Mindy Matt. Any issue of immunity would come
into play only if liability otherwise existed. 9
The court also held that no physician-patient or hospital-patient
relationship existed between the instant plaintiffs, or their decedent, and
defendants, thus refuting plaintiffs' special relationship argument.60
54. Id. at 798-99; see Petition for Wrongful Death, Legal File pp. 2-8.
55. Matt, 892 S.W.2d at 801. See also State ex rel. Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706
S.W.2d 443, 448 n.4 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (noting that Sherrill held "that treating
physicians owed no tort duty to members of the general public regarding the decision
to release a mental patient under involuntary commitment.").
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Although not necessary to its holding, the court commented in dicta that,
"[s]trangely, none of the parties to the instant appeal had cited any Missouri
statute."
6l
61. Id. The court cited several sections of the Missouri Revised Statutes as
relevant to the case at hand:
Section 632.105 reads, in pertinent part:
1. The head of a private mental health facility may, and the head of
a department mental health facility shall, except in the case of a medical
emergency and subject to the availability of suitable programs and
accommodations, accept for evaluation, on an outpatient basis if practicable,
any person eighteen years of age or over who applies for his admission
2. If a person is diagnosed as having a mental disorder, other than
mental retardation or developmental disability without another
accompanying mental disorder, and is determined to be in need of inpatient
treatment, the person may be admitted by a private mental health facility
and shall be admitted by a departmental health facility, if suitable
accommodations are available, for care and treatment as an inpatient for
such periods and under such conditions as authorized by law ....
3. A person who is admitted under this section is a voluntary patient
and shall have the right to consent to evaluation, care, treatment and
rehabilitation and shall not be medicated without his prior voluntary and
informed consent; except that medication may be given in emergency
situations.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 632.105 (1994).
Section 632.150 reads:
1. A voluntary patient who has applied for his own admission may
request his release either orally or in writing to the head [As used in
Chapter 632, "Head of mental health facility" means "superintendent or
other chief administrative officer of a mental health facility, or his
designee." See § 632.005(6).] of the mental health facility [As used in
Chapter 632, "Mental health facility" means "any residential facility, public
or private, which can provide evaluation, treatment and inpatient care to
persons suffering from a mental disorder or mental illness and which is
recognized as such by the department ... ." See § 632.005(1 1).] and shall
be released immediately; except, that if the head of the facility determines
that he is mentally disordered and, as a result, presents a likelihood of
serious physical harm to himself or others, the head of the facility may
refuse the request for release.
2. If the request for the release is refused, the mental health facility
may detain the person only if a mental health coordinator, a licensed
physician, a registered professional nurse designated by the facility and
approved by the department, a mental health professional or a peace officer
completes an application for detention for evaluation and treatment to begin
the involuntary detention of the patient under this chapter.
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The court recognized that section 632.150.1 imposes a duty on a mental
health facility to release a voluntary patient who orally or in writing requests
release. There is a statutory exception when the facility head may refuse the
request upon determination that the patient is mentally disordered, and thus,
is likely to seriously harm himself or others. However, the court in Matt
found no allegation that the head of the facility made such a determination.62
The court noted in dicta that even if such an allegation had beenmade, as in
Sherrill, Missouri courts are reluctant to find an implied civil action from a
statute which does not expressly refer to civil liability.'3 The court also noted
that, as a member of the general public, plaintiffs' decedent in Matt would not
meet the requirement that plaintiff be a member of the general class for whose
benefit the statute was enacted (i.e. abuse of children).'
The medical community was relieved that the Missouri Supreme Court
left intact the Matt and Sherrill decisions and therein declined to broaden the
scope of the duty that the medical community owes to the public regarding
dangerous mental patients. The Missouri Supreme Court's non-decision and
subtle reaffirmation of Sherrill properly limits the liability of mental health
providers and is sound for several reasons. First, mental health care and
treatment, as recognized some twenty years ago by then Chief Justice Warren
Burger, is not an exact science.65 Mental health providers should not be
liable for mere mistakes in judgment, measured by hindsight, in deciding
whether to release or restrain patients. Second, predicting actual specific
violent behavior is virtually impossible.66 In addition, a decision recognizing
a cause of action in Matt would result in: (1) diagnosis and treatment not in
the best interests of the patient, but with an eye toward potential liability of
the care giver, and (2) resolving doubts in favor of restraint, rather than less
restrictive treatment. Foremost, the Missouri Supreme Court's stance is sound
because the duty that the medical community owes to the public regarding
restraint of mental patients should be decided by the legislature, not the courts.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 632.150 (1994) (definitions added).
62. Specifically, the judge found exhibit F, attached to the petition, did not
constitute such a determination. That exhibit, dated September 6, 1990, dealt with a
prior hospitalization of Olshavsky and was signed by case worker, but it did not state
that Olshavsky was mentally disordered or presented a likelihood of serious physical
harm to herself or others. Matt, 892 S.W.2d at 802 n.4.
63. Id. at 800.
64. Id. at 801-02.
65. Warren E. Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers and the Courts, 20 FED. PROB. 3,
7 (1964).
66. See infra discussion at Part III.B of this article.
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D. Bradley v. Ray
A third Missouri case of importance Bradley v. Ray addresses the duty
to warn. As such, it should perhaps be discussed, along with Tarasoff, in Part
III.D. of this article. Because Missouri courts have analyzed the foundation
of both the duty to restrain and the duty to warn under the same criteria,
however, it is appropriate to conjunctively analyze Bradley with Matt and
Sherrill under duty to restrain.
In 1995, the Missouri Court of Appeals recognized a duty of a health care
provider to warn of a mental patient's propensity to abuse his stepdaughter.67
Notwithstanding the Missouri Supreme Court's affirmations of no duty to
warn, the Bradley court reversed a trial court decision dismissing a claim
against psychologists treating a child abuser. The trial court held that there
was no common law duty to warn appropriate officials of the child abuse.68
The petition alleged the child was abused by the perpetrator, her stepfather,
for nine years, starting when she was four years old in 1980. The defendants
were licensed Missouri psychologists who began counseling the
perpetrator/patient for abuse of the child in 1988, "but shortly thereafter
terminated the counseling."69
The Bradley court reversed the trial court's holding that there was no
duty by relying on the statutory duty to report child abuse. The statute reads
in pertinent part:
When any... psychologist, .. . has reasonable cause to suspect that a child
has been or may be subjected to abuse or neglect or observes a child being
subjected to conditions or circumstances which would reasonably result in
abuse or neglect, that person shall immediately report or cause a report to
be made to the division ....7
The court also relied on Tarasoff and held that when a health care
professional knows or should have known under his professional standard that
a patient is a serious threat to injure a readily identifiable third party, the
health care professional has a Missouri common law duty to warn the intended
victim or those capable of warning the intended victim.
7
'
The court did limit its holding by noting that "there [was] no duty to
actually control the conduct of the potential wrongdoer".72
67. Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
68. Id. at 312.
69. Id. at 305.
70. Id. at 305-06. See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.115 (1994).
71. Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 312.
72. Id. at 312 n.7.
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Bradley was in a unique context: child abuse. Thus, in light of Sherrill
and Matt (refusing to impose a duty), and the egregious facts in Bradley, the
holding in Bradley should be construed narrowly.
The court reasoned that the psychologists in Bradley: (1) should have
reasonably foreseen the threat of serious future harm to the identified victim,
a child; (2) were specifically retained to counsel the perpetrator/patient
regarding child abuse; (3) commenced treatment and were aware of the
possibility of continuing and future abuse; and (4) failed to notify law
enforcement authorities "during the counseling and upon termination of their
services as required by the Child Abuse Reporting Act, Section 210.115." The
plaintiff contended that the patient perpetrator continued to abuse the child as
a result of defendant's failure to report the abuse.
The court's negligence analysis focused on whether the psychologists had
a duty to warn the child. The court found that this was an issue of first
impression in Missouri.73
The Bradley court held that a duty to warn was supported by Missouri
law in a child abuse case:
The concept of imposition of a legal duty on certain members of the
medical profession in order to protect from future harm by a patient is...
not new in Missouri. For instance, physicians are under a legal duty to
report any patients who are infected with HIV to the Department of Health
in order to protect the public health.74 Physicians are also allowed to
disclose confidential patient information to warn spouses and care givers of
the HIV status of a patient,75 ostensibly in order to warn them of possible
future harm. Other courts have noted that there is "no reason why a similar
duty to warn should not exist when the 'disease' of the patient is a mental,
illness that poses an analogous risk of harm to others".76 For these reasons,
and in keeping with the vast majority of courts which have considered this
issue, we hold that the relationship between psychologists and their patients
is the kind of "special" relationship on which liability can be based for
failure to warn. 77
73. Id. at 306. One might question whether this was really a case of first
impression. After all, Sherrill and Matt clearly answered in the negative the question
of whether a mental health provider has the duty to restrain a mental patient. In the
context of child abuse, however, the court chose not to follow this precedent.
74. Id. at 311 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 191.653.3 (1994)).
75. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 191.656.2 (1994)).
76. Id. (citing Peck v. Counseling Serv., 499 A.2d 422, 425 (Vt. 1985) (citations
omitted)).
77. Id (citing Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1072 (Del. 1988); McIntosh v.
Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 509 (N.J. 1979); Almonte v. New York Medical College, 851
F. Supp. 34, 41 (D. Conn. 1994); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185,
189 (D. Neb. 1980); Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d
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The court distinguished Sherrill by pointing out that it was considering
a particular identified victim, and not a duty to the general public, as was at
issue in Sherrill.78 The court also emphasized the importance of the harm
being foreseeable, noting that the duty arises not from any' "special
relationship" of the parties, but from the defendant's knowledge of a
dangerous threatto the plaintiff, and time and ability to prevent the attack.79
The court then concluded that while generally an individual is not liable
for the intervening criminal act of a third person, the rule does not cover the
situation where the defendant had reasons to anticipate that criminal act.8"
Whether the plaintiff can prove the continued abuse was reasonably
foreseeable is not yet known because the case is on remand. But Bradley, at
the least, aligns Missouri with those states recognizing a duty to warn in the
child abuse context.
What is left open by the Bradley decision is whether that duty to warn
could have been satisfied by warning the victim, her mother, or persons other
than the police. The closest the court came to addressing that issue was when
it indicated that communicating the existence of such danger to those likely to
warn the victim, including notifying appropriate law enforcement authorities,
would satisfy the psychologist's duty to warn.8'
The Bradley court recognized that, in certain circumstances, the threat of
harm to an identified or identifiable potential victim, and the likelihood of
serious harm, may be so great that there should be a duty to warn. The
problem is that in Bradley, both the victim and her mother knew of the abuse,
and there js no evidence they informed the police or any other authorities.
Without the cooperation of the victim or her mother, it is uncertain whether
the police or others could have intervened. Likewise, the victim and her
mother should be estopped from claiming the mental care providers failed to
go to the police because the mother and victim did not go to the police or
other appropriate authorities.
What if the psychologists had reported the suspected abuse to the police,
who then arrested the perpetrator, only to discover there had been no
continuing abuse since the perpetrator began treatment? Absent a statute
protecting them, they would be liable for violating the patient/physician
privilege. What about the psychological damage to the family if the problems
had stopped prior to the police involvement? Exactly what factors trigger the
449, 455 (Ohio 1988)).
78. Id. at 309-10.
79. Id. at 311 (citing Reed v. Hercules Constr. Co., 693 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985)).
80. Id. at 312 (quoting Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693, 696 (Ga.
1982)).
81. Id at 306 (emphasis added).
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duty to warn, and how does one prove that it was the psychologists' failure
to call the police that caused the harm? Bradley leaves these questions
unanswered.
III. FACTORS ANALYZED BY THE COURTS IN DUTY TO WARN AND
DUTY TO RESTRAIN CASES
A. Analysis of the "Special Relationship Argument" under Missouri
Law
The four cases discussed in the preceding section demonstrate the effort
to base cases of failure to restrain or warn on recognition of a special
relationship between the defendant and a perpetrator. Under section 319 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, when there is a special relationship between
individuals, there is a duty, the breach of which creates liability.
In general, however, a person has no duty to control the actions of
another for the protection of a third person. 2 One recognized exception to
the rule is that "special relationships" can give rise to such a duty.83
In Matt, the plaintiffs asserted that the health care providers were liable
based on Restatement (Second) of Torts section 319." That section provides
that "[O]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a
duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him
from doing such harm.""5 Prior to Bradley, no Missouri court had ever
applied Restatement (Second) of Torts section 319 to impose liability on
mental health care providers. In Bradley, however, the court recognized a
duty to warn in the context of the case, but specifically held that "there is no
duty to actually control the conduct of the potential wrongdoer, only a duty
to warn."
8 6
The plaintiffs argued in Matt that Missouri follows the "special
relationship" rule found in Restatement sections 315-19.87 But while the
82. Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
83. Id.; RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-19 (1965).
84. Matt, 892 S.W.2d at 800.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965).
86. Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 312 n.7.
87. Appellant's Brief at 13-15, Matt v. Burrell, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. Ct;
App. 1995) (Missouri Supreme Court No. 77334) (citing Virginia D. v. Madesco Inv.
Corp., 648 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1983); Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse,
655 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)) ("Such relationships are usually delineated
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cases cited by the plaintiffs in Matt recognize relationships which give rise to
a duty to protect, they are not of a type contemplated by the Restatement
sections on which they rely. The proper analysis of a sections 315-19 case
requires a relationship between two persons that causes one of those persons
to protect a third person who is not part of the relationship.88 The cases cited
by the plaintiffs in Matt, however, establish a duty upon one person in the
relationship to protect the other in the relationship from the actions of a third
person. 9
Missouri cases prior to Bradley did not base a "special relationship" duty
on Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 315-19, but rather on section 344,
which deals with premises-based liability. In general, the duty to protect is
imposed upon a landowner who knows, or should know, the potential for the
type of attack suffered by the plaintiff. While Missouri courts recognize a
section 344 duty, they severely restrict it. In Faheen v. City Parking Corp.,
the plaintiff offered evidence of a series of prior violent crimes, including
arson, robbery, assault, burglary and stealing, which occurred in defendant's
parking garage.9" The plaintiff also proved that the defendant knew of these
crimes. The plaintiff argued that the landowner was liable for failing to
protect plaintiff's decedent from a fatal attack. The court held that while the
defendant had knowledge of prior violence, there had been no prior car
bombings or murders in the parking garage. The court in Faheen concluded
that because the assault on the decedent was a bomb blast, there was no
liability.9 ' Generally, Missouri courts have been loathe to impose liability for
a defendant's failure to control a third party's actions.'
88. See Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985) (suit brought by parents
of a deceased child against social host who had served the intoxicated driver who
crashed into child's vehicle); Williams v. Gorman, 520 A.2d 761 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986) (suit against a landlord after a motorcycle gang member injured a tenant
where the landlord had notice of the gang member's violent acts but failed to evict
him) as examples of the argument that defendant had a special relationship to the one
causing harm which created a duty to protect third persons, i.e. the plaintiff.
89. Matt, 892 S.W.2d at 799. The opinion cites several cases plaintiff relied
upon, including Semler v. Psychiatric Institute, 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976), Lopper
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980), and Tarasoff v. Regents
of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) to name a few.
90. Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 271.
91. Id. at 274.
92. See, e.g., Stottle v. Brown Group, Inc., 801 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) (social host not liable for serving alcohol to a guest who later injures another);
Jackson v. Bi-State Transit Sys., 550 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (bus line
not liable for injuries to passenger caused when assailant threw rock through bus
window); Hammers v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co., 792 S.W.2d 19, 21
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (insurer not liable for negligence of insured driver, even if insurer
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In Bradley, however, the court declared that the issue of placing a duty
on the treating psychologist to warn the victim or those likely to warn the
victim, was one of first impression. The court found such a duty based on
several factors. First the court recognized the importance of imposing a duty
where it might protect children from child abuse (a fact peculiar to Bradley
among the four cases discussed). This importance has been recognized by the
legislature [and the Missouri Supreme Court] in adopting Missouri Revised
Statute section 210.115.93
Another reason the Bradley court imposed a duty to warn was because
of the special relationship between a physician and a patient.94 The court,
without citing Matt, found this special relationship based on Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 315 and the statutory duties to warn in the Missouri
Revised Statutes section 191.653.3 and section 191.656.2. Once the court
finds that a special relationship exists, the duty to warn is the same, regardless
of whether the "disease" is physical or mental. 95 Finally, the Bradley court
imposed a duty because the harm to the child was clearly foreseeable.96
Although the court in Bradley found no duty to control the potential
wrongdoer, it did find a duty to warn.97 To find "special relationship"
liability under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 319, a Missouri court
should be required to find: (1) that the defendant had taken charge of the
third person, (2) the defendant knew the third person would likely cause harm
to others, and (3) the defendant failed to use reasonable care to control the
third person. In short, the issue of control should play a larger role in the
court's analysis of "special relationship."
In Sherrill, the patient had been involuntarily committed and released on
a pass. In Matt, the patient was a voluntary outpatient. Under Missouri law,
a voluntary psychiatric patient has the right to consent to any and all care,
treatment and medication.98 A voluntary patient also has the right to be
released immediately.' The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a voluntary
knew driver was incompetent when policy was issued).
93. Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 310 (citing State ex rel. D.M. v. Hoester, 681 S.W.2d
449, 552 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (noting the importance of tort actions as a deterrent to
child abuse)); Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.115 (1994).
The court in Bradley did, however, specifically decline to find a private cause of
action based on § 210.115, and thus sustained the trial court's dismissal of that count
of the petition. Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 314.
94. Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 311.
95. Id
96. Id. at 311-12.
97. Id. at 312 n.7.
98. Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.105 (1994).
99. Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.150 (1994).
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outpatient is not under the control of the institution for section 319
purposes.' 0 In Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hosp., the decedent's
estate sued a mental hospital after the decedent was killed by a police car that
was chasing an escaped mental patient.'' The court noted that a voluntary
mental patient in Illinois is entitled, by statute, to be released whenever the
person wishes during the facility's day shift.'°2 The court held that since the
patient retained that right at the time he left the facility it could not "infer that
[the patient] had been committed to [the facility's] custody."'10 3
Likewise, a Colorado court held that there is no element of control by the
mental health care provider when a patient is a voluntary one."° The court
imposed a duty on the health care provider not to release a mental patient
when the mental patient was committed involuntarily and had a propensity for
violent behavior and continuing mental illness.'
In another case, a patient being treated at a hospital for schizophrenia told
a licensed clinical social worker that voices in his head were telling him to do
"bad things."'05 After voluntarily admitting himself into an "open" ward at
the hospital, the patient walked away and sexually assaulted a woman. The
victim sued the mental health care providers claiming they owed her a duty
to restrain the patient. The court, recognizing the patient was in the hospital
voluntarily, held that there was no control, and therefore, no duty under
section 319.7
These decisions recognize the tension between the duty owed to the
public and potential victims of mental patients, and the duty owed to the
patient, which many believe includes the least restrictive treatment possible.
Early in the Tarasoff debate, Fleming and Maximov posited the
psychotherapist's dilemma as how to protect the public without abusing the
psychotherapists "awesome preemption of legal authority." That preemption,
according to Fleming and Maximov, arises from the fact the psychotherapist
often "serves not only as arresting officer, but as prosecutor, judge, and jailer
100. In Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hosp., 520 N.E.2d 37 (Il. 1988).
101. Id at 38.
102. Id. at 41.
103. Id. at42.
104. Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1216 (Col. 1989).
105. Id. at 1219.
106. Burchfield v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 1312, 1314 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
107. Id. at 1319. See also Currie v. United States, 836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987)
(the defendant lacked control); Paddock v. Chacko, 522 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that a mental health professional was under no legal duty to
involuntarily commit a patient); Santa Cruz v. Northwest Dade Community Health
Ctr., Inc., 590 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1991) (the "right to take charge" under a
§ 319 analysis does not apply to voluntary patients).
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as well" when he involuntarily commits a mental patient, and thereby deprives
the patient "of liberty, stigmatizes him, destroys his will to resist, and breaches
[his] confidentiality". 8
Another problem with applying section 319 to patient/therapist
relationships is that there is a wide range of relationships between patients and
their mental health care giver. In some instances, patients voluntarily
surrender to their care givers a great deal of control. In other instances
control of a mental patient is involuntarily thrust upon a psychotherapist by
a court ruling. The doctrine of special relationships seems better suited in the
context of innkeeper/guest, where the particular circumstances of the
relationships require little scrutiny, and there is little variance in the actual
relationship between most innkeepers and their guests.
Sometimes mental patients, either expressly or by their actions, give a
particular therapist or mental health care giver control, but do not give control
to other mental health care givers. While the Missouri cases prior to Bradley
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary control, that distinction now
seems questionable. A voluntary patient may, during moments of sanity,
recognize his dangerous proclivities and authorize voluntary control by others.
Should care givers with greater control have less liability just because the
initial commitment was voluntary? Is the duty to warn less? This Article
suggests that it should not be less.
B. Predictability of Harm
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the subtleties and
nuances of psychiatric diagnoses render certainties virtually beyond reach in
most situations."'" Unlike other health care providers, whose diagnoses can
be verified at the outset by a CAT scan, MRI, x-ray, blood tests, palpation and
surgery, psychiatric and mental health professionals cannot verify their
diagnoses, treatment or discretionary judgment, except through hindsight."'
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger observed that psychology is an infant
among the family of science."' Recognizing that psychiatry is not an exact
science, the United States Supreme Court has noted:
108. Alan A. Stone, The TarasoffDecisions, Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard
Society, 90 HARv. L. REv. 358, 362 (1976) (quoting John G. Fleming & Bruce
Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REV.
1025, 1046 (1974)).
109. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
110. See Thomas B. Almy, Psychiatric Testimony: Controlling the "Ultimate
Wizardry" in Personal Injury Actions, 19 THE FORUM 233, 243 (1984), quoted in
Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1991).
111. Burger, supra note 65, at 7.
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"[P]sychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental
illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and
symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on likelihood of future
dangerousness.""
2
As inexact as psychiatry is in general, using psychiatric evidence to
predict the future dangerousness of a patient borders on clairvoyance.
Prophecies about future violence in a particular situation cannot be guided by
statistical evidence.
One commentator on a psychiatrist's duty to warn, predating the final
decision in Tarasoff, pointed out that most of the scientific analysis focuses
on the "reliability" of psychiatric predictions, which simply refers to
agreement between observations of independent observers, and is not the same
as "validity," which refers to how accurate the judgments are."'
Scientific analysis focusing on the validity of psychiatric predictions
concludes that the predictions are inaccurate."' In one study, for example,
only a small percentage of criminally insane patients who were released from
a British hospital were found to have later committed murders."'
Probably the most remarkable study was summarized by the court in
Tarasoff.
Psychiatrists predicted that 989 persons were so dangerous that they
could not be kept even in civil mental hospitals, but would have to be kept
in maximum security hospitals run by the Department of Corrections.
Then, because of a United States Supreme Court decision, those persons
were transferred to civil hospitals. After a year, the Department of Mental
Hygiene reported that one-fifth of them had been discharged to the
community, and over half had agreed to remain as voluntary patients.
During the year, only 7 of the 989 committed or threatened any act that was
sufficiently dangerous to require retransfer to the maximum security
112. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985).
113. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 19, at 699.
114. See, e.g., John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior, Toward a
Second Generation of Therapy and Policy, 141 AM. J. OF PSYCHOLOGY 10 (1984);
Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear & Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976);
Ennis & Litwack, supra note 19, 701-03 (citing J. ZISKiN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (Law and Psychology Press)); Philip Ash, The
Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 44 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 272
(1949); Hermann 0. Schmidt & Charles P. Fonda, The Reliability of Psychiatric
Diagnosis: A New Look, 52 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 262 (1956).
115. Violence and Violent Patients: Part I, THE HARVARD MENTAL HEALTH
LETTER (Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA) June 1991, v. 7, No. 12, at 3.
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hospital. Seven correct predictions out of almost a thousand is not a very
impressive record."
6
The above study illustrates that psychiatric judgments that are intended
to be humane may subject people to an unnecessary loss of liberty."' In
addition, other studies show that psychiatric incompetence-to-stand-trial
judgments often harm rather than help defendants." 8 Numerous other studies
have reached the same conclusion."9 Faced with such reports, it is not
116. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 360 n.5; see also People v. Bumick, 535 P.2d 352,
365-66 n.17 (Cal. 1975); BRUCE J. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL
PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE LAW (1972); Ennis & Litwack, supra note 19,
at 712:
"Operation Baxstrom" [involved] 969 prisoner-patients in New York
State who were affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Baxstrom v.
Herold. The Court held that those persons remaining in Department of
Corrections hospitals after their prison terms had expired must be released,
and committed civilly, if at all. Each of the 969 patients had been detained
in maximum-security hospitals because psychiatrists determined that they
were mentally ill and too dangerous for release or even for transfer to civil
hospitals. Nevertheless, one year after the patients were transferred to civil
hospitals, 147 had been discharged to the community and the 702 who
remained were found to' present no special problems to the hospital staff.
Only 7 patients were found to be so difficult to manage or so dangerous as
to require recommitment to a Department of Corrections hospital, Several
years later, 27 percent of the patients were living in the community, only
9 had been convicted of a crime (only 2 of felonies), and only 3 percent
were in a correctional facility or hospital for the criminally insane.
As one of the authors explained elsewhere:
In statistical terms, Operation Baxstrom tells us that psychiatric
predictions are incredibly inaccurate. In human terms, it tells us that but
for a Supreme Court decision, nearly 1,000 human beings would have lived
much of their lives behind bars, without grounds privileges, without home
visits, without even the limited amenities available to civil patients, all
because a few psychiatrists, in their considered opinion, thought they were
dangerous and no one asked for proof.
BRUCE J. ENNIS, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS, IN THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
487 (Dorsen ed. 1970).
117. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 360 n.5.
118. See A. Louis McGarry, The Fate of Psychotic Offenders Returned For Trial,
127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1181 (1971).
119. As reported by Ennis & Litwack:
Another recent study, described by one observer as "the most
extensive study to date on the prediction ... of dangerousness in criminal
offenders, (citing John Monahan, Dangerous Offenders: A Critique of
Kozol, 19 CRImE & DELINQUENCY 418 (1973) confirms the lesson of
[Vol. 60
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surprising that the court in Tarasoff concluded that, "[p]sychiatrists simply
cannot predict dangerous behavior."'20
Conclusions have not changed much in the almost twenty years since
Tarasoff."' Monahan summarized his review of the literature on predictions
of violence in 1973, concluding that violence is overpredicted:
Of those predicted to be dangerous, between 65 percent and 95 percent are
false positives-that is, people who will not, in fact, commit a dangerous
act. Indeed, the literature has been consistent on this point ever since Pinel
Baxstrom. A Team of at least five mental health professionals, including
two or more psychiatrists, was asked to conduct unusually thorough clinical
examinations of individuals who had been convicted previously of serious
assaultive crimes (often sexual in nature), assigned to special treatment
programs after conviction, and who were then eligible for release. Based
upon the examinations, extensive case histories, and the results of
psychological tests, the team attempted to predict which individuals again
would commit assaultive crimes if released. These predictions of
dangerousness were made prior to the court hearings at which the ultimate
release decision were made. Of 49 patients considered by the evaluating
team to be dangerous and therefore not recommended for release, but who
nevertheless were released after a court hearing, 65 percent had not been
found to have committed a violent crime within five years of returning to
the community. In other words, two-thirds of those released despite
predictions of dangerousness by the professional team did not in fact turn
out to be dangerous.
Still another study found that only five of 1,630 parolees (.31 percent,
or less than one-third of one percent) identified by the California
Department of Corrections at the time of release as "Potentially Aggressive"
(based on a history of aggressive behavior and psychiatric predictions)
actually committed known violent crimes after release, as compared with
.28 percent of those parolees (17 of 6,082) who were not predicted to be
potentially aggressive. (citing Ernst A. Wenk, James 0. Robison & Gerald
W. Smith, Can Violence be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 393
(1972)). [E]ven for individuals know to have committed a violent act, the
best prediction available today ... is that any particular member of that
will not become violent... There has been no gross successful attempt to
identify, within either of the offender groups, a sub-class whose members
have a greater-than-even chance of engaging again in a assaultive act. Id.
at 394.
Ennis & Litwack, supra note 19, at 750-51.
Equally illustrative studies have been conducted. See D.L. Rosenhan, On Being
Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 379, 384 (1973).
120. People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 365 n.17 (Cal. 1975).
121. See Edward P. Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz, Measuring Patient Violence Is
Dangerous, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 277 (1993).
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took the chains off the supposedly dangerous mental patients at La Bicetre
in 1792, and the resulting lack of violence gave lie to the psychiatric
predictions [which] justified their restraint. Violence is vastly overpredicted
whether simple behavioral indicators are used or sophisticated multivariate
analyses are employed and whether psychological tests are administered or
thorough psychiatric examinations are performed. It is also noteworthy that
the population used ... [in recent] . . . studies was highly selective and
biased toward positive results-primarily convicted offenders, "sexual
psychopaths," and adjudicated delinquents. The fact that even in these
groups, with higher base-rates for violence than the general population,
violence cannot be validly predicted bodes very poorly for predicting
violence among those who have not committed a criminal act."2
Similarly, Ennis and Litwack concluded that the literature fails to confirm
that the mentally ill are more dangerous than the general population, or that
the psychiatric disturbance, per se, makes it easier to predict violence."s
Part of the problem with psychiatric predictions is that the
psychotherapist simply cannot accuratelyanticipatethe pressures and situations
that patients will encounter. In addition, the likelihood of an aggressive act
may largely depend on fortuitous and unpredictable circumstances. 2 4
Thus, it is not surprising that the court in Brady v. Hopper 25 held that a
policy which would impose liability upon mental health professionals for the
improper exercise of their professional judgment would establish a strict
liability standard of care. In essence, it would "require therapists to be
ultimately responsible for the actions of their patients ... [T]herapists would
be potentially liable for all harm inflicted by persons presently or formerly
under psychiatric treatment."'2" The Brady court concluded that "[h]uman
behavior is simply too unpredictable to justify liability on psychiatrists for the
behavior of their patients."'27
122. John Monahan, The Prediction of Violence, in VIOLENCE AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 15, 20 (Chappell & Monahan eds., 1975).
123. Ennis & Litwack, supra at 19, at 716.
124. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 19, at 734 (citing Guttmacher, A Review
of Cases Seen by a Court Psychiatrist, 111 THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE
DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL, 17 (J. Rappeport ed. 1967)); Monahan,
supra note 122, at 25-26 (citing Gulevich & Bourne, Mental Illness and Violence,
VIOLENCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EXiSTENCE (1970) and John Monahan,
Dangerousness and Civil Commitment (testimony before the California Assembly
Select Committee on Mentally Disordered Criminal Offenders, Dec. 13, 1973)).
125. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983), aft'd, 751 F.2d
329 (10th Cir. 1984).
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On the other hand, it is not surprising that the Missouri Court of Appeals
in Bradley reversed the dismissal of psychologists who failed to warn officials
when their patient had been abusing an identified child victim for several
years, and the chance of continued abuse was clearly foreseeable.'28
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all of the reasons
psychiatric judgments are unreliable and invalid, the following are the primary
reasons: (1) lack of training in medical schools, and specifically the
inclination to diagnose illness rather than non-illness (i.e. the reluctance to
diagnose someone as "normal"),'29 (2) class and cultural bias of the
evaluations, the personal bias and backgrounds of the evaluators, and lack of
feedback on the accuracy of the evaluator's judgments,"30 and (3) the
ambiguity of psychiatric data, and inadequacies of the diagnostic systems.1
3
'
Any study is potentially subjective, but a study of dangerousness is
particularly so. Theoretically, there are at least four psychiatric judgments
relevant to civil commitment cases: (1) is the patient "mentally ill", (2) is he
dangerous, (3) does his condition justify or require involuntary commitment
or treatment, and (4) whether such commitment or treatment will benefit the
patient.3
2
If one were to study the incident of certain dominant or recessive traits,
it would be relatively easy to get a cross section sample and to be objective
in reaching a conclusion. Of course, there would be a certain range of
variance, depending on the sample size, but the principles of statistics and
genetics are relatively objective. If you try to discuss predictability of
dangerousness, however, you immediately run into subjectiveness of defining
the sample.
The first task is to identify those who are mentally ill. The controversy
begins with the identification of the mentally ill population because there is
128. Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 311.
129. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 19, at 720 (citing Ronald Leifer, The
Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompetency: A
Sceptical Inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRACuSE L. REV.
564, 572-73 (1963); Joseph M. Livermore, et al., On the Justifications for Civil
Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75; Shah, Crime and Mental Illness: Some Problems
in DefiningandLabelingDeviantBehavior, 57 MENTAL HYGIENE 21 (1969); Maurice
K. Temerlin, Suggestion Effects in Psychiatric Diagnosis, 147 J. NERV. MENT. Dis.
349 (1968)).
130. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 19, at 720 (citing Goldberg, Simple Models on
Simple Processes: Some Research on Clinical Judgments, 23 AM. PSYCHOLOGY 483,
484 (1963)).
131. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 19, at 720.
132. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 19, at 699.
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much disagreement as to what constitutes a mental disease or defect.,"
Second, how does one decide who is dangerous to begin with? If it is not
based on past acts of violence, what determines "dangerousness?" How does
one apply the same standards to each person in the study? Regardless of the
size of the sample, or its make-up, there will always be a potentially more
dangerous study group or less dangerous study group because of the varying
degrees of dangerousness.
Even the seemingly simpler task of identifying which members in the
study group subsequently prove to be dangerous may be more difficult than
might appear at first blush. Does one take those convicted of a felony
involving force, or those charged with violent acts, regardless of whether or
not they were convicted? What about the different circumstances in which the
violent acts occurred? Does one consider the tendency of such individuals to
be in situations where the violent acts are more likely to occur? In sum, these
variables make predicting violent behavior of mental patients much more
difficult than predicting the probable incidence of dominant and recessive
traits using genetic calculations.
C. Foreseeability and Special Problems of Hindsight
The most important element in establishing a duty by one individual to
prevent harm to another is the foreseeability of the victim.'34 Going back as
far as Judge Benjamin J. Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co.,'35 courts have viewed negligence in terms of a foreseeable harm
to a foreseeable victim.
California's approach to foreseeability in the duty to warn context was
refined four years after Tarasoff in Thompson v. County of Alameda.'36 In
Thompson, a mental patient had made nonspecific threats against nonspecific
victims. Without a "foreseeable or readily identifiable target," the court said
there could be no duty on the part of the mental health care providers.'37
This parallels the explanation in Brady that "unless a patient makes specific
threats, the possibility that he may inflict injury to another is vague,
speculative and a matter of conjecture."'3 The Thompson court concluded
that the specific threat/specific victim rule was a workable and fair limit on
133. See Emily Campbell, Comment, The Psychopath and the Definition of
"Mental Disease" or Defect Under the Model Penal Code Test of Insanity: A Question
of Psychology or a Question of Lmv, 69 NEB. L. REv. 190 (1990).
134. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342.
135. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
136. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980).
137. Id. at 734.
138. Brady, 570 F. Supp. at 1338.
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the liability of mental health care professionals for the acts of their
patients.'39
In Rollins v. Peterson, the Utah Supreme Court read into section 319 of
the Restatement a requirement that "the 'others' to whom such bodily harm
is 'likely' ... must be reasonably identifiable by the custodian [of the patient]
either individually or as a member of a distinct group. 140 In Rollins, a
mental patient stole a car and collided with another vehicle, killing the
driver. 4 ' The hospital, the patient and the owners of the stolen car were all
sued by the estate of the decedent. 42 Because the victim was not reasonably
identifiable, the psychiatrist owed no duty to protect him. 143 The Rollins
court concluded that "[the victim] was simply a member of the public, no
more distinguishable to the hospital than any other person.... [The patient]
had not set himself apart in terms of dangerousness to [the victim] personally
or to any distinct group of which [the victim] was a member."1" The court
held that drivers of automobiles do not qualify as a distinct and identifiable
group. 14 As a result, because the victim in Rollins was not identifiable, he
was not foreseeable. The court concluded that without a specific threat to a
specific victim, no duty could arise.
46
Missouri's test of foreseeability requires the resulting injury to be the
"natural and probable consequence" of the defendant's negligence. 47 In
Baldwin, the plaintiff was the son of a patient who repeatedly threatened and
attempted suicide. 48 The patient was eventually released from a mental
institution. 49 The following day, he shot and killed the plaintiff's mother. 5°
Although Georgia recognized the theory of liability established by section 319
of the Restatement, the court said section 319 did not apply because the
patient in Baldwin was not under the control of the mental hospital.'
139. Thompson, 614 P.2d at 736-38.
140. Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 1158.
142. Id.




147. Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 865 (Mo. 1993) (en
bane) (emphasis added); see also Baldwin v. Hospital Authority, 383 S.E.2d 154 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1989).
148. Baldwin, 383 S.E.2d at 155.
149. Id
150. Id
151. Id. at 157.
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More importantly, the appellate court concluded that during the entire
period of treatment, the patient had not harmed or threatened to harm anyone
other than himself. 2 The court reasoned that because the patient only
threatened harm to himself, there was no basis to charge any defendant "with
the breach of a duty to foresee and prevent injury to third persons." 53
The message of Baldwin and similar cases is that the risk of harm does
not translate into the foreseeability of harm to a particular individual. In
Thompson, the defendant had recently released a juvenile offender from its
care. The defendant knew that the juvenile was extremely dangerous and
violent, and "had indicated that he would, if released, take the life of a young
child residing in [his] neighborhood."'5 4
Almost immediately after his release, the juvenile offender in Thompson
killed plaintiffs young son. He had told the defendant that he would kill a
young child in his neighborhood, and he did just that. Nevertheless, the
California Supreme Court said that while the victim was a member of the
group threatened by the juvenile, he was not the "known and specifically
foreseeable and identifiable victim of the patient's threats."' Because the
juvenile's threats were not made against a specific, identifiable victim, the
actual victim was not foreseeable.
Courts must take care not to confuse the depth of the tragedy with the
scope of the alleged negligence. As Judge Charles B. Blackmar intimated in
Sherrill, it is not difficult to look back from a tragedy and assess blame.5 6
On the other hand, there has been an ongoing history of violence and abuse
in Bradley. In the context of ongoing abuse, the burden is justifiably shifted
to the health care provider to show the harm was not foreseeable.
One commentator has developed a theory of "neuristics," defined as the
"implicit devices that individuals use to simplify complex information-
processing tasks leading to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions."
One example of "neuristics" is the vivid outrageous case which overwhelms
reams of abstract data.57 When there is a loss of human life, society's first
152. Id.
153. Id
154. Thompson, 614 P.2d at 730.
155. Id. at 734.
156. Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 668; see also Jackson v. City of Wentzville, 844
S.W.2d 585, 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
157. See Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient:
New Directions for the 1990's, 16 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 29, 53 (1992) and
references cited therein. Perlin explains:
"Availability" refers to the way that we tend to judge the probability or frequency
of an event based upon the ease with which we recall occurrences of that event;
"typification" involves the characterization of a current experience as one which
[Vol. 60
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reaction may be to impose liability and hold someone responsible. Injury or
death at the hands of a released mental patient, or anyone, is a tragedy. If
liability is imposed on mental health providers in Missouri, it should be placed
on the mental health care providers only when their decisions are made in bad
faith or with gross negligence. With the exception of the recent Bradley
decision, Missouri courts have been unwilling to reduce this standard and
extend liability because of the isolated outrageous case that seems to
overwhelm reams of data.
Bradley and cases like it are not necessarily inconsistent with Missouri
precedent. Where there is a long history of abuse of a particular identified
victim, the foreseeability of harm can not easily be denied. On the other
hand, the psychologists may be able to establish unforeseeability, due to the
fact that the patient received medication, other therapy, or was rehabilitated.
In addition, the passage of time, or other intervening factors, may also cut off
liability.
D. The Duty to Warn
The holding in Tarasofffocused on a psychiatrist's duty to warn. Should
there be a duty to warn? Should a duty to warn, created either by judicial
holding or statute, include an immunity from breach of confidentiality created
by warnings made in good faith?
The rationale for creating a duty to warn when there is a clear and
imminent danger of harm seems simple enough. Many argue that a trained
professional who is, because of their particular training and vocation, in a
unique position to know of imminent danger to a third party should have a
duty to warn that third party of imminent danger. It is at best questionable,
however, whether that presumption holds up under judicial scrutiny. It is hard
to say exactly what steps the psychotherapist should take and when. In what,
if any, circumstances is the duty expanded? One commentator posed the
many questions that arise: Having once warned the victim, is there a
continuing duty to keep the victim advised? If there is a duty to warn, should
the psychotherapist advise the victim of what to do? If the therapist's advice
is wrong, does that create liability to the victim?'
is familiar to an individual through reference to past stereotypic behavior under
"attribution theory."
Id. Basically he explains that once we adopt a stereotype, we interpret a wide variety
of additional information so as to reinforce that stereotype.
158. Robert N. Cohen, Note, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California:
The Duty to Warn: Common Lav and Statutory Problems for California
Psychotherapists, 14 CAL. W.L. RaV. 153, 169-70 (1978).
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Other questions include: Who should be warned-the victim, the police,
or others? Several situations may arise from warning the victim. First, a
victim might panic and flee, which may or may not eliminate the problem.
Second, the victim might take some significant action, such as attacking the
patient first. This raises the question: Should the therapist be liable to his
patient if the warning precipitates a violent assault upon the patient? One
corollary is whether the therapist held a higher duty to the patient or to the
patient's victim? Third, the warning might create anxiety, inducing a mental
disturbance of the victim, or cause the victim to alter his lifestyle and become
anxious and nervous.
The victim's friends or relatives may threaten or harm the patient.
Notification of law enforcement officials may create only a temporary and
prophylactic solution. Tarasoff amply demonstrates the limitations of the
police in handling such situations.
The warning itself is problematic. When should the psychotherapist
warn? How does he distinguish an idle or remote threat from an immediate
threat? Should every homicidal fantasy be reported? Does failure to report
a vague threat create liability? In sum, Tarasoff requires the mental health
professional to overpredict the danger, and second guess every evaluation.
Since energies are diverted from treatment to making legal evaluations
regarding commitment, the duty to warn may well be counterproductive." 9
The court in Tarasoff provided little help in answering these specific
concerns. Instead, the court couched its analysis in terms of generalities, such
as does discharge of the duty require the therapist to take other steps? 60
That discussion was enough to raise fears of litigation in the
psychotherapy community. 6' Not surprisingly, psychotherapists, and those
who study them, have begun to write about "litigaphobia," and specifically the
impact that the fear and reality of litigation have on the practice of psychiatry
and psychology.' Some commentators have predicted the over-commitment
159. Cohen, supra note 158, at 169-70.
160. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340.
161. See Perlin, supra note 157, at 53; Paul Applebaum, Statutory Approaches to
Limiting Psychiatrists' Liability for their Patients' Violent Acts, 146 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 821 (1989).
162. Compare Perlin, supra note 157, at 53 (discussing the impact of litigation
on decisions of mental health professionals resulting from imposing Tarasoffliability),
with Robert D. Miller, Psychotherapists'Duty to Prevent Foreseeable Harm, Schuster
v. Attenbert, 62 Wis. L. REv. 10, 68 (1989) (criticizing courts for ignoring emotional
trauma and loss of professional reputation and time by sued psychotherapists); See also
Stanley L. Brodsky, Litigaphobia: A Professional Disease, 28 CONTEMP. PSYCH. 204
(1983); Stanley L. Brodsky, A Case Report ofLitigaphobia Release from and Industry
Commitment, 2 PuB. SER. PSYCH. 11 (1983).
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of patients. 6 Other predictions included: (1) that the warnings might cause
the putative victims unnecessary emotional distress, (2) that the warnings
would lead to preemptive retaliatory violence by the warned putative victims,
and (3) that the duty to warn would drive therapists away from treating
potentially violent patients.'64
When there is a clear and present danger to an identifiable victim, there
probably should be a duty to warn. Such a duty was specifically recognized
in Missouri in Bradley. Bradley leaves unclear, however, why that duty exists
if the victim knows of the danger, or, in the case of a minor, if his or her
guardian knows. More particularly, Bradley fails to spell out who must be
warned, and how to warn, and what, if any, other action besides
communication of the danger to the victim or the victim's guardian must
occur to discharge the duty.
E. Should the Solution Come From the Legislature?
1. Current Missouri Statutes
Interestingly, part of the holding in Tarasoff relied on statutory
immunity. 6 In addition, every Missouri court faced with the issue at least
touched upon the Missouri statutes."6 Why? Because, arguably, the policy
decision of creating liability or exempting liability on a per se basis is a
question best decided by the legislature, rather than the courts.
Was the court's attempt in Matt to focus its attention on the statutory
language, despite the parties' attempts to leave that out of the case, right on
target? The amicus brief of the Missouri Hospital Association in Matt
attempted to raise the issue. 67 During oral argument before the Missouri
Supreme Court, however, counsel for both sides sought to divert and evade
the court's questions concerning statutory immunity. In the end, the court left
the question of statutory immunity unanswered.
163. See supra notes 114-15.
164. See Perlin, supra note 157, at 36-37 (citing, e.g., Theodore A. Olsen, Note,
Imposing a Duty to Warn on Psychiatrists A Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric
Profession, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 297 (1977); Elwin J. Griffith & Ezra E.H.
Griffith, Duty to Third Parties, Dangerousness, and the Right to Refuse Treatment:
Problematic Concepts for Psychiatrist and Lawyer, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 241, 247
(1978); Howard Gurevitz, M.D., Tarasoff Protective Privilege Versus Public Peril,
134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 289)).
165. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 352.
166. Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 669; Matt, 892 S.W.2d at 801; Bradley, 904 S.W.2d
at 313.
167. See Amicus brief of Missouri Hosp. Ass'n, pp. 8-13.
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A statute such as Missouri Revised Statute section 632.440, which
exempts from liability ordinary negligence regarding decisions to restrain, is
well grounded in sound policy reasoning. First, from a conventional tort
perspective, limiting liability protects the confidentiality of patient-physician
communications and the physicians duty of primary concern for their patients.
In addition, section 632.440 also allows the elected representatives of the
people to decide what is the greatest good for the greatest number. In sum,
immunity for decisions to restrain is best left to the deliberative and
representative branch of government to decide.
As a matter of fact, statutory law governing psychiatric facilities is quite
extensive. Missouri has developed a comprehensive statutory plan to
supervise, manage, license and oversee all psychiatric facilities in the state.
Chapter 632 of the state code creates the Division of Comprehensive
Psychiatric Services to carry out this plan.' 6' This plan includes a provision
immunizing the good faith decision making of mental health care providers:
No officer of a public or private agency, mental health facility, nor the
head, attending staff or consultants of any such agency or facility, nor any
mental health coordinator, registered professional nurse, licensed physician,
mental health professional . .. performing functions necessary... [shall
be civilly liable] for detaining, transporting, conditionally releasing or
discharging a person pursuant to this chapter at or before the end of the
period for which he was admitted or detained for evaluation or treatment,
so long as such duties were performed in good faith and without gross
negligence.'69
Section 632.440 "essentially codified the common law" of public official
immunity. 70 By adding the word "private," it extended the immunity to
private agencies, facilities and professional staff as well. In Porter v.
Maunnangi, plaintiff brought a wrongful death action after her son, a mental
patient, killed himself following discharge from a state hospital. The court
recognized decisions regarding the discharge of mental patients are "functions
necessary for the administration of Chapter 632," and carry no civil
liability.' 7'
In a more recent case, an involuntary mental patient released from care
later slit a woman's throat, and then stabbed her would-be rescuer to
death." Plaintiffs alleged that the mental health provider was negligent in
his decision to release the patient. The court, assuming without deciding that
168. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.010 (1994).
169. Mo. REv. STAT. § 632.440 (1994) (emphasis added).
170. See Porter v. Maunnangi, 764 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
171. Id.
172. Boyer v. Tilzer, 831 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
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632.440 confers a private right of action upon persons injured by a released
mental patient, held that liability could only attach if the plaintiff proved the
defendant mental health care provider acted in bad faith or with gross
negligence. 73 Proving "bad faith" is a heavy burden. It requires proof that
the defendant acted with "a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious
wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will
partaking of the nature of fraud."'7
Proving "gross negligence" is equally as difficult. After repeated
holdings that there are no "degrees of negligence,"'7 1 Missouri courts have
struggled to define the term because of the General Assembly's penchant for
using it.1'7 The court in Sherrill defined it as "reckless conduct done with
knowledge that there is a strong possibility of harm and indifference as to that
likely harm."'177 Mistakes in diagnosis or judgment or even simple negligence
do not rise to the level of "conscious indifference" or "willful and wanton
abrogation of professional duties."'7
Decisions regarding both detention and release of patients, and qualified
immunity for those decisions, are expressly covered by Chapter 632. Logic
dictates that the same immunity should apply to decisions not to admit a
patient. The same discretion and professional judgment must be exercised by
a health care professional in deciding to hospitalize a patient or release a
patient already hospitalized, as in deciding not to hospitalize or not to release
a hospitalized patient. To hold that section 632.440 applies only to the actions
of "detaining, transporting, conditionally releasing or discharging," and not to
decisions not to detain, transport, release or discharge would be illogical.
Although the authors are aware of no Missouri case where a party attempted
to draw this distinction, and thus it has not been addressed by the courts, it
would seem likely to occur given the similar argument raised in Matt that
immunity covered public but not private psychotherapists because they
specifically described the former but not the latter. 179 If courts were to
recognize distinctions between whether to act or forego acting, physicians
would be forced to commit a patient, even one who did not require inpatient
or involuntary care, just to take advantage of the statutory immunity for
releasing that patient.
173. Id.
174. State exrel. Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443,447 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
175. Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 664.
176. Boyer, 831 S.W.2d at 697.
177. Id. at 698 (quoting Duncan v. Missouri Bd. of Architects, 744 S.W.2d 524,
533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
178. Id.
179. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 6-7, Matt v. Burrell, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 796
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (No. 18983-2) (Missouri Supreme Court No. 77334).
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This flies in the face of the statutory plan of comprehensive psychiatric
services, which requires patients be placed in the "least restrictive
environment" possible consistent with the "best interests of the patient.' 8 0
Chapter 632 "emphasize[s] the need for the exercise of discretion and
judgment" by health care providers.' Deciding to detain is discretionary.
Deciding to release should be discretionary. A holding that detention and
immediate release would give the doctor immunity but failure to detain would
not, would be ludicrous. A decision not to detain a patient, provided it is
done in good faith and without gross negligence, is a professional judgment
that should qualify for statutory immunity. To hold otherwise would conflict
with the statutory plan by "encouraging an 'all or nothing' approach to
detention of mental health patients."'
8 2
In Bunting v. Huckstep, a husband sued a mental hospital for wrongful
death after his wife wandered from the facility and was struck by a car. The
Missouri court held that under any theory, the liability of the defendants
would be "inextricably linked" to professional decisions about the detention
and restraint of the patient. Those decisions are "precisely the sort of
discretionary judgment the legislature has seen fit to render immune from civil
liability.' 83 Otherwise "treating physicians would indulge every presumption
in favor of further restraint, out of fear of being sued. Such a climate is not
in the public interest."'"
The plain language of section 632.440 applies the doctrine of qualified
immunity equally to public and private mental health care providers. The
Missouri Supreme Court has proclaimed that "the primary rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain the legislative intent from the statute's language
... [considering] the words in their plain and ordinary meaning."' 85 "Private
is not defined in the statute, but courts should give the word its 'plain and
ordinary' meaning as found in the dictionary."'816  Webster's Third New
International Dictionary defines "private" as "not invested with or engaged in
public office or employment."'8 7 In other words, every mental health care
provider, whether it is a state hospital or a private mental health facility, is
governed by Chapter 632 and is vested with the same qualified immunity. 88
180. Mo. REv. STAT. § 632.385 (1994).
181. Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 664.
182. Bunting v. Huckstep, 853 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
183. Id.
184. Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 664.
185. Brownstein v. Rhomberg-Haglin & Assoc., 824 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Mo. 1992)
(en bane).
186. Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
187. WEBSTER'S THIR NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1805 (3rd ed. 1971).
188. See Twiehaus, 706 S.W.2d at 448 n.4 (holding that Sherrill gave immunity
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This statutory scheme approximately immunizes care givers for ordinary acts
of negligence.
2. The Duty to Warn and Need for Legislation
Missouri statutory immunity, as it stands now, focuses only on the duty
to restrain. In addition, Missouri has statutory provisions creating a duty to
warn in limited circumstances involving particular medical conditions.'89
There are no statutes in Missouri, however, that specifically require that
warnings be given to potential victims of mental patients. In addition, no
Missouri statute grants immunity for such warnings, or immunity when no
warning is given.
It is less likely that legislatures will focus on creating liability or
immunity for liability regarding failure to warn. Professor Alan Stone, in his
article following Tarasoff, noted that while it may be appropriate in certain
circumstances for the psychotherapist to warn the police of dangers presented
by a patient, it would be counterproductive to impose on the psychotherapist
a duty to warn victims."9 This is so because warning victims is incompatible
with an effective therapeutic relationship. Imposing this duty would have the
effect of deterring both patients and therapists from undertaking treatment, and
thus, would further increase the risk of violent behavior. 9' The same type of
confidential relationship exists between an attorney and a client. An attorney
is under an ethical duty to warn of future crime. Perhaps in both situations
it is, or should be, a moral or an ethical, not a legal duty. 92 It is difficult to
understand why, other than the fact the psychotherapist may have the actual
ability to control or restrain the patient, the same duty to potential third party
victims should not be imposed on the attorney, teacher, clergy or others who
knew of threatened harm.193
to "treating physicians," not just state-employed physicians).
189. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 210.115, 191.653.3, and 191.656.2 (1994).
190. Stone, supra note 108, at 368.
191. Stone, supra note 108, at 368; see also, Note, Duty to Report, 7 J. CONTEMP.
H. L. & POLICY 87 (1991).
192, This is not just a theoretical consideration. For instance, the Matt plaintiffs
based a large part of their argument on a "moral blame" theory. See Appellant's Brief
at 41-43, Matt v. Burrell, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (Missouri
Supreme Court No. 77334). The plaintiffs argued, "social morality dictates that there
is a duty to avoid this harm, if such harm could be reasonably avoided. Id. at 43.
193. One possible distinction would be the argument that the psychotherapist is
specifically trained to identify abnormal behavior, evaluate threats and the ability of
the patient to carry them out, while the teacher, attorney or clergy may not be similarly
educated. This article goes on to note, however, that a psychiatrist's ability to predict
violent behavior is limited. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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The psychotherapists' dilemma may in part be one of their own making:
For years, psychiatrists as advisors to the judicial system have fostered
the belief that they are the only professionals who can predict violence.
Courts, parole boards, legislatures, and the public at large have taken their
word for it. Now, when this belief has become a double-edged sword, they
are retreating from their long held position.
This inconsistent position leads to some interesting anomalies. Dr.
Lee Coleman, writing to the Supreme Court after a rehearing was granted
in the Tarasoff case, said: "It is hard for me to understand how the
psychiatric community can have it both ways-to be free of an obligation
to warn on the basis of inability to predict dangerousness, and yet to have
the authority to incarcerate patients on the basis of an ability to predict
dangerousness."'94
Legislative guidance on the duty to warn may be helpful. One useful
safeguard that could be added by the legislature to counteract the propensity
to overpredict dangerousness would be to require a second independent
professional opinion before either involuntary commitment, or breaking
confidentiality to warn third parties. 9 ' A second safeguard would be to
provide in any statute granting immunity for involuntary commitment or
warning that such initiative be taken only when danger is truly imminent.
96
A third safeguard would be to require psychotherapists to inform patients of
the psychotherapist's potential duty to warn before the patient divulges any
information and to get the patient's consent.97 Informed consent includes:
(1) informing the patient before therapy of the limits to confidentiality and,
(2) informing the patient of the implicit risk to him of disclosures beyond the
agreed limits.'98 The purposes of such informed consent are two-fold: (1) it
is an essential condition for the patient's right to accept or reject therapy under
conditions of informed consent, and (2) it may help make assessment of
dangerousness more accurate by screening out some exaggerated threats of
194. Brad S. Seligman, Note, Untangling Tarasoff, Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 203 (1977) (quoting Letter to
California Supreme Court, March 11, 1975, quoted in R. Jack Ayres, Jr. & John T.
Holbrook, Law, Psychotherapy, and the Duty to Warn: A Tragic Trilogy?, 27 BAYLOR
L. REv. 677, 686 (1975)) (first footnote omitted).
195. See John G. Fleming & Bruce Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The
Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1025, 1065 (1974).
196. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 195, at 1065. Another writer called this
imposed standard one of clear danger. See Seligman, supra note 194, at 209.
197. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 195, at 1066.
198. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 195, at 1066.
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harm.'99 In addition, the therapist may properly give more weight to
confessions the patient makes knowing that they might be disclosed to others.
A fourth safeguard would be to statutorily mandate that any civil
commitment be based on proof of necessity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commentators have noted that both the prospective patient and the accused
criminal are subjected to a potentially coercive process which may result in
loss of liberty."' The patient has fewer procedural protections than the
criminally accused. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is one example.20' In
In Re Winship, however, the United States Supreme Court disregarded the
civil-criminal distinction and required proof beyond a reasonable doubt before
"civilly" committing the alleged juvenile delinquent. 2 Whether the purpose
of the proceeding was therapeutic or punitive was irrelevant. The Supreme
Court rejected the "good intentions" rationale because the potential outcome
of the proceeding, incarceration in a state institution, 3 was a consequence
which mandated the safeguards.
Another commentator urging for more safeguards concerning a mental
health provider's duty to warn explains that emerging trends reveal a pattern
of expanding liability in that: (1) the requirement of a specific and
identifiable victim appears to be losing strength, (2) the imminence of danger
required to trigger the duty to protect appears to be lessening, (3) the initially
broad buffer zone of reasonable practice is beginning to erode as clinical
choices, such as civil commitment, become legal duties, and (4) the judiciary
appears to be generating more confidence in psychotherapists' ability to
predict dangerousness. 2"
One writer identified the dilemma posed between the Tarasoff decisions
and the confidentiality provision in the California statutes:
The duty to warn recited in Tarasoffand the confidentiality provisions
of LPSA hold a California psychotherapist, treating patients under LPSA,
in an apparently inextricable dilemma. If the psychotherapist does not give
the warning under the Tarasoff standard, then he may be liable for civil
damages, or if he does give the warning, the patient whose confidence he
199. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 195, at 1066.
200. See supra notes 114-17.
201. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (reiterating that proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt is a constitutional requirement in criminal proceedings); See
also Ennis & Litwack, supra note 19, at 750-51 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 520-26 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952)).
202. Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66.
203. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967).
204. Steven C. Bednar, Note, The Psychotherapists' Calamity: Emerging Trends
in the Tarasoff Doctrine, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 261, 281.
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has betrayed may sue him on the statutory basis of section 5330 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code." 5
The commentator then identified four ways to reconcile Tarasoff and
California statutory law:
One alternative for the legislature would be to amend section 5328 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code to include a dangerous patient exception
A second alternative would be to repeal the statutory cause of action
embodied in section 5330 of the Welfare and Institutions Code which
allows a patient to recover damages for disclosure of confidential
information...
A third alternative, which may be an adequate compromise, is to allow
the legislature to add immunity provisions to both the Evidence Code and
the Welfare and Institutions Code with regard to the warning...
A fourth alternative, which is supported by the American Psychiatric
Association, is to limit the Tarasoff decision and hold that provisions of
LPSA regarding involuntary commitment of a dangerous person apply to
the Tarasoff facts.
Another way to reconcile the duty to wam with the duty of
confidentiality would be to require the following steps before a mental health
provider could be eligible for immunity from civil suits for breach of either
duty:
(1) Attempt to convince the patient to seek voluntary confinement.
(2) Attempt to limit or identify, if possible, the person(s) endangered
by the patient's conduct in the event he must be warned.
(3) If the patient is diagnosed as dangerous to himself or others,
commence involuntary commitment proceedings.
(4) If involuntary commitment is impossible, notify local law
enforcement agencies.
(5) If the intended victim is in immediate or imminent danger of
physical harm, warn the victim, his family, or his friends.2"
Of course, the most extreme course would simply be to categorically
grant immunity from duty to warn suits to mental health professionals for the
future acts of their patients." 7
205. Cohen, supra note 158, at 178.
206. Cohen, supra note 158, at 178-79.
207. See Paul Appelbaum et al., Statutory Approaches to Limiting Psychiatrists'
Liability for Their Patients' Violent Acts, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 821 (1989); see also
Michael R. Geske, Note, Statutes Limiting Mental Health Professionals' Liability for
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3. Current Legislation and Models
Currently, there is no pending Missouri legislation addressing either the
issues raised or holdings in the recent Missouri appellate court decisions (i.e.
Bradley, Matt, and Sherrill), or which would change the current Missouri
statutory scheme."' On March 3, 1995, however, Missouri Governor Mel
Carnahan established the nineteen member McBride Commission "to
recommend enhancements to civil involuntary treatment laws as well as
circumstances under which outpatient involuntary mental health treatment
should be mandated. 
2 9
While a full analysis of the McBride Commission's report210 is beyond
the scope of this article, it should be noted that findings and recommendations
that would impact the issues presented in Bradley, Matt, and Sherrill may
include the following: (1) The Commission recommends that persons with
mental illness and their caregivers statutorily be provided with effective and
rapid access to mental health services; (2) The Commission recommends
increased use of public administrators, quicker access to courts, and
enhancement of various client/patient rights statutes to protect and care for
patients; (3) The Commission recommends statutes which would clarify the
law, including provisions for more consumer input and provisions for the
proper use of medical records.2"
Although it is one of the first, the McBride Commission Report will
hardly be the last word on the subject in Missouri. Its implementation would
clearly create additional rights for mental health patients, responsibilities for
mental health care providers, and provide faster state intervention. The
questions left unanswered include at what cost can this be accomplished, and
are these added protections realistic?
At least seventeen states have adopted legislation to clarify and/or limit
the liability under Tarasoff and its progeny." 2
the Violent Acts of Their Patients, 64 IND. L.J. 391, 412 (1989).
208. Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.040 (1994).
209. Missouri Exec. Order No. 95-09 (March 3, 1995).
210. THE McBRIDE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE MEL CARNAHAN,
GOVERNOR, STATE OF MISSOURI (Sept. 29, 1995).
211. MCBRIDE COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 210, at 1-4.
212. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-117
(1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5402 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.2415 (West
1991 and Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 6-1902, 1903 (Supp. 1995); IND. CODE. ANN.
§§ 34-4-12.4-1 to -4 (Bums 1995 Supp.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5603 (1992); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 202 A.400 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2800.2 (West 1991 and 1995 Supp.); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 129A
(West Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1946 (West Supp. 1989); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 148.975-976 (West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1101 to -03
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One commentator offers the following suggested model for such a statute:
Mental Health Professionals' Liability for the Violent Acts of Patients.
Section 1. A mental health professional is immune from liability to
persons other than a patient for failing to predict or warn or take
precautions to protect from a patient's violent behavior, unless
A) the patient communicated a threat to the mental health
professional, and
B) the threat is coupled with the apparent intent and ability to carry
out the threat that the patient will use physical violence or other
means of harm to cause serious personal injury or death to reasonably
identifiable persons.
Section 2. Regardless of any other provision of law, a mental health
professional's duty to warn or take precautions arises only under the limited
circumstances described in section 1.
Section 3. A mental health professional's duty to warn of or take
precautions to protect another from the threatened violence of a patient is
discharged by the mental health professional giving a warning or taking
precautionary actions such as
A) communicating the threat to the potential victim or victims,
B) informing a law enforcement agency having jurisdiction in the
patient's or victim's place of residence,
C) seeking civil commitment of the patient, or
D) any other actions,
provided that the action which the professional takes is reasonably suited
to the circumstances. The professional to whom a threat is communicated
may also discharge the duty under section 1 by informing a person
designated by the professional's employer as the individual who has the
responsibility to warn or take precautions.
Section 4. A mental health professional is immune from liability
under state statutes which protect patient privacy and confidentiality for
actions taken in good faith to discharge the duty which has arisen or may
have arisen under section 1.213
The Michigan statutory provision, incorporating many of the above ideas,
should provide a model for Missouri law:
(1) If a patient communicates to a mental health practitioner who is
treating the patient a threat of physical violence against a reasonably
identifiable third person and the patient has the apparent intent and ability
to carry out that threat in the foreseeable future, the mental health
(1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:31, 330-A:22 (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5122.34 (Anderson 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-101 to -102 (1992 & Supp.
1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.120 (West 1992).
213. Geske, supra note 199, at 419.
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practitioner has a duty to take action as prescribed in subsection (2).
Except as provided in this section, a mental health practitioner does not
have a duty to warn a third person of a threat as described in this
subsection or to protect the third person.
(2) A mental health practitioner has discharged the duty created under
subsection (1) if the mental health practitioner, subsequent to the threat,
does [one] or more of the following in a timely manner:
(a) Hospitalizes the patient or initiates proceedings to hospitalize the patient
under chapter 4 or 4a.
(b) Makes a reasonable attempt to communicate the threat to the third
person and communicates the threat to the local police department or county
sheriff for the area where the third person resides or for the area where the
patient resides, or to the state police.
(c) If the mental health practitioner has reason to believe that the third
person who is threatened is a minor or is incompetent by other than age,
takes the steps set forth in subdivision (b) and communicates the threat to
the department of social services in the county where the minor resides and
to the third person's custodial parent, noncustodial parent, or legal guardian,
whoever is appropriate in the best interests of the third person.
(3) If a patient described in subsection (1) is being treated through
team treatment in a hospital and if the individual in charge of the patient's
treatment decides to discharge the duty created in subsection (1) by a means
described in subsection (2)(b) or (c), the hospital shall designate an
individual to communicate the threat to the necessary persons.
(4) A psychiatrist or psychologist [or psychiatric social worker] who
determines in good faith that a particular situation presents a duty under this
section and who complies with the duty does not violate. . . . [the
applicable laws] .... [or] physician-patient privilege....
The above model and Michigan statute have many positive aspects.
Rather than a duty arising whenever a therapist determines the patient presents
a danger, both require a specific communicated threat as a prerequisite to a
duty to warn or hospitalize. Both also require, as a prerequisite, that the
patient has the apparent intent and ability to carry out the threat in the
foreseeable future against a reasonably identifiable third person. Foremost
both the model and the Michigan statute offer alternatives to disclosing
confidential information by exonerating from liability a psychotherapist who
hospitalizes the dangerous patient, or seeks involuntary commitment.
Arguably, these models appear to provide the clarity lacking in the
Tarasoff decision. However, ambiguities are hidden in statutory language,
such as what constitutes a threat, exactly how far the therapist must go to seek
214. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1946 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (footnotes
omitted).
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commitment, or what other actions would relieve the therapist from liability.
A more detailed model might take the form of the following:
Mental Health Professionals' Liability for the Violent Acts of Patients.
Section 1. A mental health professional including psychiatrist,
psychologist, licensed nurse practitioner and those operating under their
direction and supervision are immune from liability to persons other than
a patient for failing to predict or warn or take precautions to protect others
from a patient's violent behavior, except where:
A) the patient communicates a threat of physical harm to the mental health
professional, and
B) the threat is coupled with the apparent intent and ability to carry out the
threat that the patient will use physical violence to cause serious personal
injury or death to reasonably identifiable persons.
Section 2. Regardless of any other provision of law, a mental health
professional's duty to warn or take precautions arises only in the limited
circumstances described in section 1.
Section 3. A mental health professional's duty to warn of or take
precautions to protect another from the threatened violence of a patient is
discharged by the mental health professional giving a warning or taking
reasonable precautionary actions, including, but not limited to:
A) communicating or attempting to communicate the threat to the potential
victim or victims,
B) informing a law enforcement agency having jurisdiction in the patient's
or victim's place of residence of the threat, and the whereabouts of the
patient and victims, if known,
C) seeking civil commitment of the patient by initiating a formal process
of commitment or taking reasonable steps precedent to initiating such
commitment, or
D) providing medication or other medical treatment to the patient which
is reasonably calculated to eliminate or decrease the threat.
The professional to whom a threat is communicated may also
discharge the duty under section 1 by informing a person designated by the
professional's employer as the individual who has the responsibility to warn
or take precautions, except that where the identified or potential victim is
a minor the healthcare profession must inform appropriate authorities
pursuant to Mo. RFv. STAT. section 210.115.
Section 4. A mental health professional is immune from any and all
liability under state statutes and from any common law rights or causes of
action which protect patient privacy and confidentiality, for actions taken
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While the above model is based on Missouri case law and present
Missouri Statutes, the need for a national standard may be appropriate.2"5 For
example, just as most states have adopted the Restatement of Torts and the
Uniform Commercial Code, states could also be encouraged to adopt a
uniform law governing psychotherapist duty and immunity.
Arguably such a statute would settle the law, rather than leaving it to the
courts to develop or limit a duty on an incremental case by case basis in an
area where bad facts may encourage a bad judicial solution, as was arguably
the result in Tarasoff. Professional psychotherapists would know what duty
they had in specified circumstances, and they could document the facts and
their actions by appropriate record keeping, establishing that they had
complied with the statute. Of course, a uniform code will not extinguish
litigation. Litigation will frequently be necessary to determine whether the
psychotherapist can establish facts bringing them under the statutory
immunity. However, at least, there would be a national standard to offer
guidance in this new and undefined area of the law.
The authors, however, do not endorse the adoption of the last model, or
of any model, it is preferable that the legislature, rather than the courts, decide
if and when the case law immunity should be abrogated, if that is to
occur."6 On the other hand, if the legislature decides not to grant blanket
immunity, it should detail the exact circumstances and scope of the duty, and
how it can be discharged to avoid liability.
CONCLUSION
A duty to restrain is more onerous than a duty to warn on both the
patient, who is normally unrestricted by any warning, and the psychotherapist,
who can normally communicate a warning with much less effort than
restraining an unwilling subject. This article focuses on an analysis of
Missouri law governing the duty, if any, owed by a psychotherapist, or other
mental health care provider, to potential third party victims. This article does
not focus on the distinctions between restraint or warning, or even other ways
that duty might be fulfilled, but answers the more general question of whether
a mental health care provider in Missouri owes a duty to third party victims.
Because of the incremental development of case law occasioned by the
facts of the specific cases, and the various forms of statutes addressing the
issue, any particular state may have recognized a duty to warn, but not a duty
215. See Maryellen Kelleher, Note, Psychotherapists and the Duty to Warn, an
Attempt at Clarification, 19 NEw ENG. L. REv. 597, 614 (1983).
216. For example, the child abuse context would be a situation when case law
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to restrain, or vice versa. Along the same lines, a state may have enacted
legislation granting immunity for restraint, but not for warning (i.e., breach of
confidentiality). Finally, there may be other things that mental health care
providers can and should do which would satisfy the duty, if any, besides
restraint or warning. Such precautionary actions include counseling,
medication, or other treatment of the patient. The focus of this article, i.e.,
when a duty arises, does not address the issue of what constitutes performance
or breach of that duty. The issue of breach depends on the idiocentric facts
of a particular case.
Notwithstanding the above, if Missouri courts were to impose a duty on
the part of the mental health care providers to the general public to protect
them from the violent acts of their patients, particularly without specific
guidelines, hospitals, treatment facilities, and mental health care providers
throughout the state would suffer a wide-ranging and detrimental effect.
Regardless of the circumstances under which the court imposes a duty to
wam or a duty to restrain, a holding of liability would likely increase the
numbers of involuntary commitments to mental health facilities in Missouri.
One need not be clairvoyant to appreciate that fact. Faced with a choice
between commitment of a patient and potential liability for misdiagnosis of
wellness (even a misdiagnosis that is well within the standard of care), the
therapist would be pressured to choose commitment. Such a decision would
not only be based on something other than the best interests of the patient, but
would fly in the face of Missouri's statutory plan for psychiatric treatment.
Section 632.385 provides that patients shall be placed in the "least
restrictive environment" consistent with the best interests of the patient. This
requires mental health professionals to employ a two-step analysis before
involuntary commitment: (1) would involuntary commitment in any
circumstances be in the best interest of this particular patient, and (2) is
involuntary commitment the least restrictive means of caring for this patient?
A judicial determination which would have liability flow from a therapist's
mistaken answer to either of those questions would pressure the therapists to
answer "yes" to both questions. Although there is immunity for good faith
decisions, that defense will not likely thwart lawsuits or prevent the case from
going to a jury. Once the case goes to the jury, a good faith defense is not
likely to impress a jury who, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, sees the clear
path from the threatened behavior to commitment of the injurious act.
The public policy of the state of Missouri is to use restraint and detention
only as a last resort.2"7 Restraint on a patient is only authorized "when less
restrictive alternatives have failed. 218 If a patient is not currently acting out
217. See MO. CODE. REGS. tit. 9, § 30-4.044 (1995) ("Every effort should be
made to minimize the likelihood that [restraint] will be needed.")
218. MO. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 30-4.004(2)(A) (1995).
[Vol. 60
46
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/1
DUTY TO RESTRAIN OR WARN
violent tendencies toward another, how is a therapist or mental health
professional to know that the less restrictive alternatives they have chosen to
treat that patient have failed?
The patient's liberty interests are also at stake. The Missouri Supreme
Court was concerned about the liberty interest of the involuntary patient in
Sherrill."9 Concern about the liberty interests of an involuntary patient
committed under civil commitment proceedings should extend to a voluntary
outpatient who subsequently becomes an involuntary patient. A climate that
would lead to involuntary restraints for no more reason than a private citizen's
suspicion that a patient is dangerous would not be in the public's best
interest.2
20
If mental health professionals are subject to liability for their decisions
to release patients, then few patients will ever be released. The now
discredited practice of "warehousing" mental patients will once again become
the norm, and the hope of recovery and rehabilitation for patients currently
held for their protection will be hindered at best, and eliminated at worst."'
These dire predictions are somewhat consistent with the actual results from a
California survey following Tarasoffi
The survey revealed that therapists, acting under professional and
ethical standards, have often given warnings to third parties in the past: it
thereby suggests that Tarasoff did not mandate a radical change in
therapeutic practice. But the study also revealed that imposing on therapists
a legal duty to warn, as opposed to the traditionally discretionary
professional duty, has had potentially detrimental effects on psychotherapy.
Therapists report feeling serious anxiety because of their uncertainty about
the scope of their new duty to warn. More specifically, many therapists
report altering the character of their dialogue with their patients by focusing
their own clinical attention as well as their patients' attention on the
patients' capacity for violent behavior and the possibility of breaches in
confidentiality to respond to the risk of such behavior.222
If people suffering from mental problems were faced with the prospect
of being "warehoused," locked behind bars where the principal concern of the
219. "Corley was an involuntary patient, but he was not a convict." Sherrill, 653
S.W.2d at 664.
220. Id. It has been recognized that mental illness may be caused or intensified
by institutionalizing mentalpatients. Paddock, 522 So. 2d at 413-14 (emphasis added).
221. See Paradies v. Benedictine Hosp., 431 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980).
222. Toni P. Wise, Note, Where the Public Peril'Begins: A Survey of
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staff was not recovery and rehabilitation, but restraint and detention, how
many of those people would be willing to consult therapists and other mental
health professionals?
Insane asylums have flunked the test of time. Missouri courts should not
resurrect Bedlam by imposing unsound duties on mental health care providers.
The risk of imposing liability for the professional judgments of therapists is
too great, and the price to be paid by mental patients is too high, for society
to return to the ancient practice of insane asylums.2"
Perhaps of lesser importance, but also significant, is the nature of the
duty that Tarasoffplaces on psychotherapists. As one writer aptly expressed
it, "It is reprehensible that therapists should have to suffer civil and statutory
penalties for failing to perform a function which they are incapable of
performing properly." 4
Since Bradley, there is at least a narrow duty to warn in the context of
child abuse. The duty to warn could easily be, and is likely to be, extended
to other professionals in similar situations, including, .but not limited to,
attorneys,' college counselors, social workers, marriage counselors, the
clergy, friends, relatives and business associates, 6 and volunteers in crisis-
prevention centers. 7 While the duty to warn is less onerous on both the
psychotherapist, in most situations, and the patient, it has its own set of
problems: confidentiality, who must be warned, when, what are the
consequences when, for example, the warning alters relationships, or results
in the potential victim attacking the patient.
To paraphrase Ennis & Litwack, the decision to deprive individuals of
liberty is a serious one, but because human behavior is difficult to understand,
and presently impossible to accurately predict, society must decide how much
it values individual freedom, self-determination, and the privacy of
patient/psychotherapist communications when assessing what duties should be
imposed on the psychotherapist. 8 In this context, the decision to deprive
223. A co-author recalls decades ago when families sometimes elected to keep at
home a demented member. This would avoid the disgrace of "Nevada," a state
asylum. A hasp and pin secured the upstairs room, with boards or tin nailed over the
outside window.
224. See Cohen, supra note 152, at 182.
225. See Marc L. Sands, The Attorneys Affirmative Duty to Warn Foreseeable
Victims of a Client's Intended Violent Assault, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 355 (1986).
226. See Terry W. Milne, Note, "Bless me Father, for I am About to Sin...
Should Clergy Counselors have a Duty to Protect Third Parties, 22 TULSA L.J. 139
(1986).
227. See Theodore A. Olsen, Note, The Duty to Warn, 48 COLO. L. REV. 283,
308 (1977).
228. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 19, at 749-51.
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one of liberty or the confidentiality of their communications is a social, not
a psychiatric, judgment, which should be made, if at all, only under clear
guidelines. Those guidelines should come from the legislature.
The authors would recommend that the law, as embodied in the Missouri
Statutes and announced in the Sherrill and Matt decisions, not be altered, and
that the liability in Bradley be limited to the circumstances of that decision.
The legislature should not intervene at this point. If the legislature is to take
any action, it should only be to codify those decisions. Missouri law should
remain that health care professionals are not liable for injuries to third parties
caused by their patients or for failure to warn such third parties, except when
(1) it is child abuse, or (2) there is likely harm to an identified potential
victim, and the mental health care provider is proved to have acted in bad
faith or with gross negligence.
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